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The aim of the thesis is to study how cultural variables, specifically social capital,
affect the industrial structure of countries. The literature has focused mainly on
the impact of cultural traits on macroeconomic variables, such as the growth rate of
GDP and unemployment (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017; Yang and Lester, 2000).
Little attention has been devoted to the study of cultural traits within the field of
industrial organization. In this thesis we focus on how social capital affects a specific
aspect of the organization of an industry, namely the degree of vertical integration.
Our main hypothesis is that by promoting trust, trustworthiness and reciprocity,
social capital reduces vertical integration. In the thesis we provide both empirical
evidence of the impact of social capital on vertical integration and a theoretical
model explaining in greater detail how this mechanism works. In doing so we do
not just add to the literature on industrial organization, but also shed light on
one additional channel trough which social capital affects economic performance of
countries: via the industrial structure. The thesis is divided into three papers:
a literature review, an empirical paper and a theoretical-one. The first paper is
a literature review dealing with the impact of different cultural traits on economic
variables. The contributions in the field of culture and economics have grown rapidly
in the last decade. The paper tries to highlight the main topics in the related
literature and represents the starting point for my subsequent research. According to
the review of the literature, equality of opportunities coupled with a strong emphasis
on individual effort represent the backbone of flourishing economies. The survey also
highlights that the effects of culture on the industrial structure of countries has been
poorly investigated. That is why the remainder of the thesis analyses one possible
impact of culture on industrial organization, that of social capital on procurement
decisions. The second paper empirically investigates the impact of social capital on
vertical integration in manufacturing. The main hypothesis is that social capital
reduces vertical integration. Social capital is taught to induce reciprocal behavior
and to limit opportunism. By doing so it reduces transaction costs and it leads
firms to rely more on market transactions than on internal provision of inputs. The
hypothesis that social capital reduces vertical integration is confirmed using a sample
of 974 manufacturing sectors belonging to 30 European countries. Furthermore, the
empirical evidence shows that this effect is stronger in industries characterized by low
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levels of R&D, than in R&D intensive ones. Because of the high degree of the input’s
complexity, in these industries firms do not rely too much on the fairness of their
transaction counterparts. The third paper contains a theoretical model explaining
in greater detail the mechanism linking social capital to vertical integration. We
model the procurement relationship as a principal-agent problem. The principal
is a downstream firm that needs an input which is produced by a better informed
upstream firm-agent. The characteristics of this input are not known ex-ante and the
downstream firm must decide whether to delegate the decision of this characteristics
to the upstream firm or to produce the input internally. If the upstream firm is
interested only in its material payoff, then it may be optimal for the downstream
firm to produce the input internally (vertical integration). We model social capital in
terms of reciprocity. A player is said to be reciprocal if it is prepared to give-up part
of his material payoff to reward/punish a kind/unkind counterpart. We show that
reciprocity makes market transaction more likely. Furthermore, reciprocity increases
the freedom granted to the upstream firm in deciding the characteristics of the input
to be produced.
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Does Culture Matter for the Economic
Performance of Countries?
An Overview of the Literature
Marco Castellani
Abstract
From the point of view of economic development the world is far from being
homogeneous. Among the possible causes of such uneven evolution, culture
is starting to attract the attention of a growing number of scholars. The
present paper surveys some of the most important contributions on culture
and economics, with a particular focus on the definition and measurement of
culture and on the impact of different cultural traits on economic variables.
According to the review of the literature, cultures emphasizing individual effort
while providing equal opportunities to everyone are more likely to lead to
sustained economic growth.
JEL Classifications: Z10, Z12, O10, O17.
Keywords: cultural economics, religion, economic development, institutional
arrangements.
1 Introduction
What determines the huge differences in economic conditions worldwide? Why
poorer countries do not simply replicate what richer-ones are doing? Why in-
dividuals often behave differently from what economic theory predicts? The
economic literature has grouped the answers to these questions in three main
categories. The first one focuses on the role of institutions (Acemoglu, 2008);
the second one highlights the importance of psychological factors (Rabin, 1993;
Thaler, 1985). The third answer is that culture plays a major role here (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015). As far as differences in economic conditions are con-
cerned, governments do not operate in a cultural vacuum, so that policies
aimed at fostering economic growth must be tailored to the prevailing cul-
ture to be effective (Greif, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Thomas and Mueller, 2000;
A shorter version of this paper is currently in press on Journal of Policy Modeling (2018),
DOI:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.06.006.
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Glaeser et al., 2004; Minkov and Blagoev, 2009; Tabellini, 2010).
Furtermore, not all cultures are equally favorable for economic growth. A fa-
mous example is represented by the underdevelopment of some African coun-
tries (Barro, 1991). According to Platteau (2000), some tribal societies in
Africa consider economy a zero-sum game (the so-called limited good syn-
drome), in which every private gain is obtained at the expense of the collec-
tivity and determined by luck, fraud or witchcraft. Moreover, Schwartz (2004)
reports that in sub-Saharian Africa, individuals find meaning in life trough
protecting the traditional order and are thus discouraged to pursue social and
economic success. In the same way, many Native American cultures discourage
individuals from distinguishing themselves and emerging as better than others
(Lester, 1997). In such cultural environments it is almost impossible to start
a new entrepreneurial or innovation activity, to accumulate and invest wealth
and, thus, to spur economic growth (Mokyr, 2016).
Culture, in particular strong family ties, can also lead family firms not to be-
have in an optimizing way, since they cause firm’s objectives to merge with
those of the family and thus not to respond to profit-maximizing conditions hy-
pothesized in theoretical models (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Even when indi-
viduals are rational utility maximizers, culture can explain behaviors that neo-
classical economists would label as puzzling (Papamarcos and Watson, 2006).
Until recent years, however, economists disregarded culture in their analyses of
economic phenomena, leaving the field to sociologists, anthropologists, politi-
cal scientists and organization scholars (Minkov and Blagoev, 2009; Maridal,
2013). This has not always been the case: classical economists were well aware
of the important role played by culture in shaping both the society and the
economy. Back in the eighteenth century, Adam Smith pointed out the piv-
otal role played by trust in essentially every market transaction. Then, in the
nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill recognized that under certain conditions
there is a primacy of cultural constraints over the pursuit of personal interest
(Mill, 1843). In his oft-cited book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Cap-
italism, Weber (1905) states that by encouraging individuals to pursue their
own wealth, the Protestant Reformation was one of the main forces behind
the development of capitalism (Weber, 1905). In a similar fashion, Sombart
(1951); Bellah (1957); Ooms (1985); Hofstede and Bond (1988); Landes (1998),
document that also other religions possess a work ethic that made it possible
for capitalism to develop. On the other hand, Karl Marx (1859) was con-
vinced that it is the economic structure, with its underlying technology that
determines the prevailing culture. Marx’ and Weber’s contrasting views sug-
gest that an important issue in the field of culture and economics deals with
the direction of causality: is it culture that affects the economic conditions of
countries or vice versa?
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The contribution of these early proponents, however, fell on deaf ears for many
years, since economists felt no need to introduce in their models new and fuzzy
variables, like cultural ones. This lack of interest was mainly due to the absence
of a clear definition of culture (Guiso et al., 2006; Weil, 2013; Roland, 2015).
Furthermore, cultural explanations were at great risk of been interpreted as
products of intellectual laziness, gathering all the factors that traditional mod-
els were unable to capture (Fukuyama, 2001; Roland, 2015). Culture was,
at best, considered a selection mechanism between different equilibria (Greif,
1994).
The way in which culture finally managed to enter the economic discourse was
trough the work and ideas of non-economists. The most important contribu-
tions are those by Banfield (1958) and Putnam et al. (1994). In The Moral
Basis of a Backward Society, Banfield reports that in Montegranaro, a small
city in the South of Italy, individuals act to maximize the short-run mate-
rial advantage of their nuclear family and assume that all others will do the
same. This selfish behavior, labeled amoral familism, is a good candidate in
explaining the development gap between Northern and Southern Italy. Put-
nam et al. (1994), instead, investigate how localized social capital affects the
performance of institutions in Italy and conclude that more altruistic societies
tend to have better institutions. Between the end of the twentieth and the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the idea that including culture could
enrich the understanding of economic phenomena begun to attract a growing
number of scholars and the problem of how to do it was clearly on the table.
Of course, the availability of larger datasets measuring cultural values and the
improvement of statistical tools both played a major role in this shift of atten-
tion towards culture.
It deserves to be noticed that more business-oriented scholars recognized the
importance of cultural factors well before other economists. In the late twenti-
eth century cultural explanations were already commonly accepted in subfields
like strategy, management and organization theory (Kirkman et al., 2006; Pa-
pamarcos and Watson, 2006). The oft-cited example of the importance of
cultural factors in management is the one about Toyota and the impracticabil-
ity to simply blind copy its organization in the Western world, because of the
impossibility to replicate the cultural setting that sustains the so-called just in
time production technique (Liker, 2004). Culture is also widely used to explain
motivations that drive entrepreneurs (Basu and Altinay, 2002). However, in a
certain sense, economists have always built their theories relying on cultural
norms. In the typical market transaction there is an implicit assumption that
individuals will behave correctly and not rob or murder one another because
cultural norms, and not formalized-ones, require so (Fukuyama, 2001). In-
dividuals can ignore formal rules, unless strongly motivated to follow them
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(Greif, 2006; Salmon and Serra, 2017). Culture can provide individuals with
such motivation. Thus, the literature on culture and economics is just a ten-
tative to explicitly assert what has been implicitly already stated in classical
economic literature.
The vast majority of the empirical contributions reviewed in the present pa-
per are country level analyses. Individual and regional level studies are rare
because of data availability. Publicly available datasets are usually employed
for cross-country studies. Sometimes they provide data defined at a more
dis-aggregated level (usually regional level), but the number of observations
for each unit are too low to perform reliable analyses. Studies at a more
dis-aggregated level thus rely on specific data, usually collected using ad-hoc
surveys.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First of all the concept of cul-
ture must be clarified, that is why Section 2 provides the reader with some
definitions of culture. Section 3 deals with measurement issues, presenting the
three most commonly employed approaches to data collection: surveys (3.1),
epidemiological studies (3.2) and experiments (3.3). A fourth data source,
which is still an emerging-one, big data, is briefly mentioned in Section 3.4.
Section 4 lists the most studied cultural traits: trust (4.1), individualism (4.2),
importance of family ties and generalized morality (4.3), attitudes toward work
and the perception of poverty (4.4). Section 5 focuses on the most common
issues cultural economics is dealing with: those of causality (5.1), persistence
(5.2) and economic outcomes (5.3). Cultural consequences on countries’ in-
stitutions (5.3.1), economic performances (5.3.2), financial (5.3.3) and labor
markets (5.3.4), as well as innovation (5.3.5) represent the core of this pa-
per. Section 6 summarizes the main findings from the review of the literature.
Section 7 is devoted to conclusions, suggestions for future research and recom-
mendations.
2 Defining culture: an intriguing task
The literature is rich with definitions of culture, which differ depending on the
field they are applied to and the aims they are meant to serve. Back in the
fifties, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) list over 150 different definitions. They
can refer to symbols, (Geertz, 1973), or heuristics (Boyd and Richerson, 1985,
2005), or even artifacts (Kroeber and Parsons, 1958), but most commonly they
deal with beliefs and values (at least in the economic literature). Before stat-
ing what culture is intended to be by economists, it is useful to say what it
is not. Culture is not the same as education or human capital, although it
shares some features with these latter (Greif, 1994). Both of them are difficult
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to define and to measure and experienced initial skepticism that went along
with them in their first attempts to enter the economic debate.
A definition that is gathering a growing consensus among scholars (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015) is the one provided by Guiso et al. (2006, p. 23). They
formalize culture “as those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious,
and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation”.
Beliefs or priors are those rules of thumb that help individuals making decisions
when they lack previous experience, while values are preferences of individuals.
A slightly different definition can be found in Roland (2015, p. 2): “Culture is
generally defined as the set of values and beliefs people in a given community
have about how the world (both nature and society) works as well as the norms
of behavior derived from that set of values”. While the definitions seem almost
overlapping, they differ in the meaning attached to beliefs. Roland (2015, p. 2)
states that: “Beliefs relate to expectations about natural phenomena and peo-
ple’s behavior or reactions to other peoples’ behavior. Defined in this way, in a
game-theoretic framework, beliefs “can both add new predictions to economic
models and eliminate conventional predictions”(Rabin, 1993, p. 1282). In the
one-shot prisoner dilemma, beliefs about fairness and reciprocity can allow the
efficient equilibrium to emerge. It is important to notice that while Guiso
et al. (2006) clearly point to the fact that culture evolves very slowly (“fairly
unchanged”), this is not so clear in the definition provided by Roland (2015).
As highlighted in Alesina and Giuliano (2015) not all definitions consider both
values and beliefs. Greif (1994, p. 915), for instance, focuses only on beliefs,
defining them as “ideas and thoughts common to several individuals that gov-
ern interaction-between these people, and between them, their gods, and other
groups-and differ from knowledge in that they are not empirically discovered or
analytically proven (and) become. . . known through the socialization process”.
Putting together the contributions by Guiso et al. (2006); Roland (2015); Greif
(1994), three main features of culture emerge:
1. culture is common to a group of individuals and is transmitted trough
socialization;
2. culture puts informal constraints on human interaction;
3. culture is not the same as knowledge or human capital.
3 Approaches to data collection
Measuring culture is probably the most challenging issue for economists. Defi-
nitions like the ones presented in the previous Section tell nothing about what
exactly should be measured. Values and beliefs are too vague as concepts in
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order to be quantified. Measuring culture per se is impossible. Specific cultural
traits, like trust or the importance of family ties represent the object of analysis
in this field. Cultural traits can be considered both as attributes of the sin-
gle individual (micro level) or as characteristics of the society at large (macro
level). As will be made clearer in the next Sections, some collection techniques
are more suitable to collect data for studies at the micro level, while others
are more suitable for macro-level studies. According to Alesina and Giuliano
(2015), data collection techniques could be grouped into three large categories:
surveys, epidemiological studies and experiments. In our view, there is also a
fourth approach, whose importance is likely to grow rapidly in the future: big
data.
3.1 Surveys
The most common way of measuring culture is through surveys asking respon-
dents to evaluate the importance they attach to a given set of value items.
None of the three most famous surveys dealing with culture has been designed
by an economist. According to Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) and Roland
(2015), the most popular survey is the World Values Survey (hereafter, WVS),
developed by Ronald Inglehart, a political science professor at University of
Michigan. It deals with topics like generalized trust, happiness, health and
political engagement. By the time of writing the present paper, the sixth wave
of the WVS has already been completed and it covers 60 countries worldwide.1
Another famous attempt is represented by the Schwartz Values Survey, named
after Shalom H. Schwartz, a cross-cultural psychologists. His idea is that soci-
eties differ in the way they answer three critical issues. The first one concerns
the boundaries between the person and the group. Accordingly, societies can
be more autonomous or more embedded. In autonomous societies, individuals
are expected to cultivate and express their own preferences, ideas and abilities
(intellectual autonomy), as well as feelings and pleasure (affective autonomy).
On the other hand, embedded societies rely on respect for tradition and tend to
suppress any action that may compromise the maintenance of the status-quo.
The second problem is how to preserve the social fabric , i.e. how to induce
individuals to behave responsibly towards others. The two polar answers to
this problem are labeled egalitarianism and hierarchy. Egalitarianism rests on
the idea that all individuals are human beings and must be treated equally.
1Other examples of databases measuring cultural values in a way similar to the WVS include:
the International Social Survey Programme, The General Social Survey for the USA, the European
Social Survey, the European Values Study and a series of so-called barometers, like the Afro-,
Latino-, Asian- and Euro-ones.
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Hierarchy, on the other hand, is based on systems of ascribed rules to ensure
responsible behavior of individuals. Last but not least, societies must also face
the problem of how to manage their relations with the natural and social world.
Harmony leads at accepting things as they are, while mastery encourages ac-
tive self-assertion in order to attain personal or group goals. These dimensions
are not independent. According to Schwartz, for instance, embeddedness and
autonomy are hardly joinly present in the same population, and the same holds
true for egaliatarianism and hierarchy or for mastery and harmony. On the
other hand, it is possible to find cultures that are simultaneously characterized
both by autonomy and mastery or by hierarchy and embeddedness. Data for
the construction of these dimensions are obtained by a dedicated survey, the
so-called Schwartz Values Survey, which is based on answers to questions sub-
mitted to K-12 schoolteachers and college students, in which they are asked to
state the importance of 56-57 value items as guiding principles in their lives.
Last but not least Geert Hofstede surveyed IBM’s marketing department em-
ployees worldwide (Hofstede, 2001).2 From this data he was able to construct
four basic cultural indicators. The first and most important one is individ-
ualism (Roland, 2015), which measures the relative importance of the indi-
vidual and his goals over the group and the conformity to it. Its opposite
being collectivism.3 The second dimension, power distance, refers to the ex-
tent to which less powerful individuals in organizations and institutions not
only accept, but also expect that power is unequally distributed. The third
dimension, masculinity, relates to the dominance of male and male’s values
(like competitiveness) over female and female’s values.4 Last but not least,
uncertainty avoidance measures a society’s tolerance for situations with uncer-
tain outcomes. Many later works highlight the fact that dimensions identified
by Hofstede and Schwartz are overlapping to a certain extent: Hofstede’s in-
dividualism is positively correlated with both types of Schwartz’s autonomies
and with WVS’s measure of generalized morality and negatively correlated
with Schwartz’s embeddedness dimension (Schwartz, 2004; Gorodnichenko and
Roland, 2017, 2011; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Roland, 2015). Surprisingly,
2As anticipated earlier in the paper, neither he is an economicst. In fact Geert Hofstede is a
psychologist.
3The literature is still disputing whether individualistic and collectivist traits can coexist within
a given culture, or they are mutually exclusive (Papamarcos and Watson, 2006). Hayek (1960), for
instance, points out that liberty and responsibility go together, since only if freedom is constrained
by a strong sense of responsibility for others, free societies can survive and flourish.
4This is probably the most misunderstood of Hofstede’s dimensions: too often femininity is
confounded with feminism (Papamarcos and Watson, 2006). Hofstede labeled this dimension mas-
culinity/femininity, since it was the only dimension where men and women scored significantly
different.
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individualism correlates positively also with egalitarianism (Schwartz, 2004)
and negatively with hierarchy (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011), and power
distance correlates positively with embeddedness (Schwartz, 2004). A major
difference between the three surveys mentioned above is that while Hofstede
and Schwartz propose composite indicators based on their raw data, the WVS
does not.
Since it is difficult to design detailed large-scale questionnaires, survey data are
usually employed to construct cultural variables at the country level. However,
there are some exceptions of ad-hoc designed surveys used in micro analyses,
like in Guiso et al. (2008).
There are many contradictions in using surveys to study the cultural traits
of countries (OECD, 2017). To begin with, translation of questionnaires in
different languages is not a simple task as it may seem. Secondly, conditions
in which individuals find themselves to live may affect answers they give to
questionnaires, the so-called framing effect (Roland, 2015). Last but not least,
respondents may answer to questions according to what they think the inter-
viewer expects from them, rather than manifesting their true opinion (Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2001).
3.2 Epidemiological studies
A second way to measure cultural traits is the so-called epidemiological ap-
proach in which the units of observation are immigrants in a host country.
Firstly developed in medicine, epidemiological studies were aimed at disentan-
gling the genetic origin of some diseases from the environmental and lifestyle-
related causes. When applied to economics they allow to study how immigrants
from different countries behave when they face a common institutional and so-
cioeconomic environment (Fernàndez, 2011). Since it is difficult to imagine
that newcomers immediately adapt their habits to those of the country of set-
tlement, differences in behavior between immigrants and natives probably stem
from different cultural backgrounds they have inherited from their ancestors in
the home country (Hofstede, 2001; Vinogradov and Kolvereid, 2007). Exam-
ples of epidemiological studies include preferences for redistribution (Luttmer
and Singhal, 2011), trust (Guiso et al., 2006), fertility (Fernàndez and Fogli,
2006, 2009) living arrangements (Giuliano, 2007) and labor markets (Alesina
et al., 2015). Since epidemiological studies tend to consider immigrants as a
homogeneous group, they are usually employed in macro level analyses. The
literature is almost unanimous in pointing at second-generation immigrants
as the most suitable sample. This is due to a limited impact of confound-
ing factors, like the selection due to migration mechanism or the inability
of newly-arrived immigrants to speak the host country language (Fernàndez,
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2011). The idea behind the selection due to migration mechanism is that im-
migrants may not be a representative sample of individuals in their country
of origin: they may well have decided to leave their home environment specif-
ically because they do not feel part of it and thus their culture may differ
from the one prevailing in their home country. This, along with the fact that
parents are not the only source of cultural transmission and that by “look-
ing at immigrants, we are not seeing culture in its purest form”(Weil, 2013,
p. 424), causes the epidemiological approach to be biased toward findings that
culture is not important (Fernàndez, 2011). The epidemiological approach is
quite new in economics, since until the sixties, when evidence of the resilience
of ethnic and religious traits became undeniable, many social scientist were
convinced that the assimilation of immigrants into a cultural melting pot is
a fast process (Bisin and Verdier, 2005). Still, there is evidence that, as time
goes by, differences in behavior between immigrates and native-born citizens
tend to decline (Carroll et al., 1994).
3.3 Experiments
The third way to measure culture and test whether it affects economic out-
comes is via experiments, typically ultimatum, trust and public good games
(Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). According to Roth (1995); Henrich (2000),
ultimatum games clearly point to the fact that players’ behavior undeniably
deviates from the predictions of game theory, not only in that individuals offer
more and tend to have higher rejection rates than expected, but also in that
they play the game differently according to the society they belong to. An in-
digenous population of the Peruvian Amazon, the Machiguenga are reported
to offer less than subjects in more developed societies and this is probably due
to the fact that they are not accustomed at cooperation (and thus at sharing
its outcomes) outside the family. Trust games reveal that individuals tend
to offer more than predicted by game theory (Ho and Weigelt, 2005). As far
as public good experiments are concerned, Castro Finocchiaro (2008) reports
that British subjects tend to contribute significantly more than Italians, when
they know that the other members of the group are compatriots. This could
be due to different levels of trust prevailing in the two countries: Britain is
characterized by higher level of interpersonal trust than Italy. This, in turn
may cause British individuals to free-ride less, since they expect that also other
subjects involved in the game will behave in the same way (Inglehart, 2000).
The number of participants in an experiment is usually small compared to sur-
veys. Detailed information on individual level characteristics of participants
such as age, gender etc. can be easily collected. Experiment are thus suitable
also for analyses at the individual level.
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As highlighted in Alesina and Giuliano (2015), a major source of potential
weakness of experiments is the external validity of results obtained in very
specific contexts.
3.4 Big data
There is also a fourth way to study culture, which is not mentioned in Alesina
and Giuliano (2015), probably because it’s importance is still marginal, but it
is easy to imagine that it will grow in the next future: big data. According
to Snijders et al. (2012, p. 1), “Big Data is a loosely defined term used to de-
scribe data sets so large and complex that they become awkward to work with
using standard statistical software”. Usually they come from the Internet,
are unsolicited and do not suffer from the already mentioned framing effect
(Curini et al., 2015). They can be particularly helpful for young researches
at the beginning of their careers, because of low costs and quick availability
(Edelman, 2012). Internet data have already been used in several economic
subfields, spanning from microeconomics to history of economic thought (Edel-
man, 2012) and they are starting to find their way in the field of culture and
economics. According to Edelman (2012) also experiments can be conducted
online. Varian (2014), however, points to the fact that because of some pecu-
liarities of big data, like their jumbo dimension, one must be especially careful
in selecting the appropriate statistical tools. Information overload, a situation
in which the quantity of information greatly exceeds human cognitive process-
ing capacity, requires new, ad-hoc designed methodologies, as for example text
mining to handle such huge datsets (Feldman and Sanger, 2007). Recently, a
new stream of research, labeled culturomics has emerged (Michel et al., 2011).
Based on a quantitative analysis of words and phrases, it is aimed at extrap-
olating cultural trends from digital sources, like Google Books. Murrell and
Schmidt (2011), for instance, analyze the number of occurrences of words like
freedom and liberty in books and pamphlets in English printed in England
between 1559 and 1714 to study how culture and formal institutions coevolve.
Following their approach, one can identify words or phrases that are thought
to be related to a given cultural trait and use the number of occurrences in
e-books, newspapers and social media as proxies for the cultural trait under
analysis. For instance one can proxy the importance of family ties with the
number of times the word nepotism appears in the most read newspapers in
a given country for a given year. Dividing the number of occurrences by, say,
the number of articles published in the same year, one can study both how the
importance of family ties differs across countries and how it evolves over time.
The field is still in its infancy, probably because such an analysis requires
specialists from different fields to work together: linguists, anthropologists,
14
computer scientists, economists etc. So far Big Data have been employed for
studies at the macro level, given that individual-level observation are usually
shield by privacy law.
4 Reviewing the literature: the most stud-
ied cultural traits
From the review of the literature and following Alesina and Giuliano (2015),
we have identified some cultural traits that have been studied more often
than others and have established themselves as cornerstones in the field of
culture and economics. All these traits can be defined both at the micro and
at the macro level. Trust, for instance, can be considered both as a feature
of the single individual as well as a characteristic of the whole society. When
citing empirical contributions we will generally clarify if they refer to the micro
(individual) or to the macro (country) level.
4.1 Generalized trust
Generalized trust can be defined as the degree of trust a person has towards
another (Guiso et al., 2008) and is the most studied and often considered
the most important cultural trait (Roland, 2015). As already stated in the
introduction, the idea that trust plays a major role in market transactions dates
back at least to the eighteenth century and Adam Smith. In the nineteenth
century, Mill (1848, p. 132) identifies the lack of individuals who are supposed
to be trusted as the major “impediment to conducting business concerns on a
large scale”. The term generalized refers precisely to the fact that trust should
not be intended as circumscribed to family members only, but extended also
toward strangers (Marini, 2004). If trust is instead referred only to familiy
members and close friends, it could result in negative outcomes for the society
at large, as envisioned by Banfield (1958). In the twentieth century, Arrow
(1972, p. 357) wrote that “Virtually every commercial transaction has within
itself an element of trust”. If there is a lack of trust in the economy, agents will
spend a great amount of resources (time) in verifying others’ actions and build
external enforcement of contractual agreements, thus reducing the amount of
inputs for the production process, as well as benefits from the division of labor
and gains from trade (Zak and Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Tabellini, 2010). At
the macro level, Guiso et al. (2009) find that bilateral trust between European
countries rises trade of goods, financial assets and direct investments. The
literature on social capital often refers to trust as one of its two components,
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the other usually being a measure of how much individuals are engaged in the
civic society (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005).
It is thus everything but surprising that trust positively affects also the quality
of institutions (La Porta et al., 1999). One may then conclude that trust
positively affects the economy, but this is not necessarily true at the individual
level. Butler et al. (2016), for instance, report that the relationship between
trust and individual income is hump-shaped. Too-much trusting individuals
may engage in highly-risky businesses with extremely volatile outcomes.
When dealing with trust a major problem arises: how to distinguish culturally-
based beliefs from rational expectations (Guiso et al., 2006). The available
empirical evidence suggests that trust does not depend much on life experiences
and it is hardly developed via repeated social interactions (Alesina and Glaeser,
2004; Castro Finocchiaro, 2008; Uslaner, 2008).
Generalized trust is usually measured using survey data. The most employed
item comes from the WVS and asks respondents whether most people can
be trusted. The percentage of individuals responding that most people can be
trusted has been used by several authors as a measure of trust (La Porta et al.,
1997; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011). A less trodden path to measure trust
is trough experiments, in particular trust games.
4.2 Individualism
Cross-cultural psychologists often consider the individualism-collectivism cleav-
age as the profound structure of cultural differences (Triandis et al., 1988;
Triandis and Suh, 2002; Heine, 2015; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017; Roland,
2015). Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) empirically confirm its importance
in shaping long-run growth. Restating what has already been written in Sec-
tion 3, the primacy of the individual over the group characterize individualistic
societies. The opposite holds true in collectivistic ones (Triandis, 1995). The
impact of the individualism-collectivism dualism on economic variables is ana-
lyzed in greater detail in Section 5.3. While individualism has a positive effect
on innovation and per capita income, it makes collective action more difficult
and can lead to opportunistic behaviours, such as free riding (Greif, 1994; Chen
et al., 2002; Etzioni, 1988; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Furthermore, individ-
ualists are more prone to harm the collectivity if this provides them with an
advanatge, even more in tasks where individual effort is difficult to determine
(Earley, 1989; Wagner, 1995; Chen et al., 2002). On the other hand, individ-
ualistic cultures are characterized by anonymous transactions, which lead to
a greater number of possible trading partners and thus to a larger extent of
the market, compared to collectivistic societies (Greif, 1994). As long as the
division of labor is induced by the dimension of the market, individualistic so-
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cieties are more likely to experiment sustained long-run growth. Individualism
is usually assessed relying both on Hofstede’s measure of individualism and
Schwartz’s mastery dimension.
4.3 Family ties and Generalized morality
Although it is a common sense to perceive cohesive family groups as something
positive, the economic outcomes of societies based on strong family ties are less
so. While promoting codes of good conduct within small circles of related per-
sons, such societies tend to consider selfishness outside the family as something
acceptable or, worse, normal (Banfield, 1958). This, in turn, erodes generalized
trust (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010, 2014). The idea that too-strong family ties
could harm economic development dates back at Weber (1905). Accordingly,
capitalism needs individualistic forms of entrepreneurship and the absence of
nepotism in order to emerge and prosper. Strong family ties, instead, are con-
ducive to nepotism which generates negative incentives and erodes trust when
promotion decisions in family firms are determined by consanguinity rather
than by merit (Zak and Knack, 2001; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007). Furthermore, Fukuyama (1995) reports that on the one
hand, causing distrust to reign outside family boundaries, strong family ties
impede the development of formal institutions. On the other hand, they favor
the born and rise of suboptimal economic organizations, not able to respond
properly to market challenges (McClelland, 1961).
Closely related to the importance of family ties there is another cultural di-
mension: generalized, as opposed to limited morality. The distinction between
the two types of morality rests on the extension of the group individuals are
prone to cooperate with. Limited morality refers to situations in which individ-
uals tend to cooperate only with immediate family members, while generalized
morality indicates situations where cooperation is extended toward the whole
society. At the macro level, limited morality, interpreted as a lack of respect
both for other members of the community and for the res publica, may cause
public good provision to be inadequate and corruption, as well as nepotism,
to emerge (Tabellini, 2010). According to Fukuyama (2001, p. 3133): “Early
Protestantism enjoined its members to behave morally. . . toward all human be-
ings”and not just toward fellow believers, as many other religions did. This,
in turn, increased the number of potential trading partners and thus the ben-
efits deriving from the division of labor. Measures of the strength of family
ties and of morality do not convey the same message and are usually treated
separately, as in Alesina and Giuliano (2015). Nevertheless from a theoretical
point of view they can be considered jointly, since both deal with the impor-
tance of the family relative to the broadest society.
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The WVS is, once again, the principal tool used to construct cultural dimen-
sions, both for the strength of family ties (questions regarding the importance
of family), and for generalized morality (questions regarding respect for oth-
ers).
4.4 Attitudes toward work and the perception of
poverty
Some societies see hard work as the main driving force of success, while other
believe that luck is the primary source of it. Such cultural diversity can lead
to substantially different economic outcomes (Weber, 1905). As highlighted
in Tabellini (2010) and Weil (2013), if individuals believe that success stems
from their individual effort rather than from luck, they will probably work
harder, have greater propensity to invest, to innovate and to start new eco-
nomic activities. At the macro level, Minkov and Blagoev (2009) empirically
demonstrate that countries in which individuals consider leisure important,
tend to perform poorly in terms of GDP, its growth rate, as well as saving and
investment rates.
Accepting the idea that hard work is likely to pay off probably leads to consider
poverty as one’s fault, and therefore to reduce the level of income redistribution
by public authorities. At the macro level, the luck-hypothesis is typically asso-
ciated with a generous welfare state. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) report that in cross country comparisons the proportion
of people who believe that luck determines income is positively correlated with
spending in social welfare compared to GDP.
Also here the WVS is the primary source of data: there are questions regard-
ing both the relevance of hard work versus luck in determining success in life
and laziness and bad luck in determining poorness.
Before concluding this section, it is important to stress two points. To begin
with, cultural dimensions analyzed so-far have been treated separately. This
does not mean that they are not interconnected, but rather, that culture is
decomposable (Mokyr, 2016). Secondly, the vast majority of cultural measures
are aggregated at the national level (Schwartz, 2004). However, within coun-
tries there can be substantial heterogeneity based on age (see Section 5.2),
gender and ethnic group (Levie, 2007). The psychological literature dealing
with personality theory suggests that there is a gender difference in cultural
traits. Women, for instance, tend to trust more and be more altruistic than
men do. Furthermore, this gender differences seem to be persistent over the
life-cycle of individuals and to be present in counties at different stages of eco-
nomic development. Women tend also to score higher than men on extraversion
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(Feingold, 1994), although many studies questioned this particular difference
(Chapman et al., 2007). Such differences are usually ascribed to different pres-
sures that men and women have faced during the history of humanity. Other
traits, like openness to new ideas do not seem to vary consistently between gen-
ders. For an overview of the topic, see the introductory section in Chapman
et al. (2007). The economic literature has generally ignored gender differences
in cultural traits, probably because it is difficult to map psychological traits
into cultural ones. The heterogeneity of cultural traits at the county level is
precisely what whetted the interest of early scholars (Banfield, 1958; Putnam
et al., 1994) and underlies the epidemiological approach.
5 Culture and economics: main issues
Although only in its infancy (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017), the litera-
ture on culture and economics has developed itself around four main research
questions, those of causality, persistence and impact on economic variables.
Addressing the issues of causality and persistence are typically preparatory
tasks, which, if disregarded, cause the legitimacy of culture as a determinant
of institutional and economic outcomes to be questionable.
5.1 Causality
So far, implicitly, it has been taken for granted that culture can account for
differences in economic outcomes between countries. However, the possibility
that causality flows from economic variables to cultural ones must be taken into
account. Inglehart and Baker (2000); Fernàndez (2011) believe that it is eco-
nomic development which has a powerful impact on cultural values, rather than
the other way round. This thesis is empirically confirmed by Henrich et al.
(2001). Performing the canonical ultimatum game in 15 not-industrialized
small-scale societies, they find substantial deviations both from the textbook
prediction of the homo economicus and from the behavior of individuals in in-
dustrialized societies, due to the different structure of production and market
integration prevailing within this societies. Individuals that are accustomed at
cooperating in their everyday production activity, will offer higher stacks and
the same holds true if they are more familiar with anonymous market trans-
actions. Such evidence strongly claims in favor of Marx’s suggestion that the
structure of production influences culture and economic relations (Guiso et al.,
2006). In a similar fashion, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and Inglehart
and Baker (2000) both provide evidence of the effect that a particular political
regime, namely Communism, had on culture of individuals living under it.
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The possibilities of reverse and simultaneous causality are clearly on the table
and they must be addressed with appropriate statistical tools. The canoni-
cal ordinary least squares regression does not allow to isolate the impact of
the independent variable on the dependent one, leaving aside the (theoretically
plausible) effect of this dependent variable on the independent one. A common
solution to this problem is represented by the Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS)
or Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. Accordingly, the first thing to do is
to find one or more variables, labeled instruments, which are correlated with
the cultural trait whose effect is under investigation, and are supposed to im-
pact the dependent variable only trough the cultural trait. The IV procedure
can be divided in three steps: first, run a regression in which the cultural trait
is the dependent variable and the instruments (plus the controls of the original
regression) are the independent ones (first-stage regression); second, compute
the predicted values for the instrumented variable from this regression; third,
use this predicted values, rather than the original ones, as regressor in the
original regression model (second-stage regression). The coefficients in the
second-stage regression will capture only the effect of the dependent variable
on the independent-one, filtering out any shadow of reverse causality (Guiso
et al., 2006; Verbeek, 2017; Hill et al., 2017; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017).
Since instruments must be exogenous to the relationship under analysis, they
are usually taken from other disciplines, like linguistics (Licht et al., 2007) and
genetics (Guiso et al., 2004; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017).
5.2 Cultural persistence and transmission
One of the most debated issues in contemporary literature is whether it takes
centuries for cultural traits to change or if this is a fast process. Scholars
are almost unanimous in stating that culture does change (Weber, 1905; Mc-
Grath et al., 1992b; Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 2004; Inglehart andWelzel, 2005;
Tabellini, 2010).5 What is less clear is whether culture is fast- or slow-moving.
In this second case culture is said to be persistent or resilient. On the one
hand, McGrath et al. (1992b); Glaeser et al. (2000); Hofstede (2001); Wennek-
ers et al. (2007) document strong persistence of culture. On the other hand,
there are also some defenders of the fast-moving hypothesis, like Fukuyama
(2001); Mokyr (2016). Stating the support for one of the two possibilities is
not an end in itself, since only persistence allows to use culture in explaining
long-run phenomena.
In principle one can think of cultural traits as public goods . Consider, for in-
5Exception to the mainstream idea can be found in Sowell (1994); Kohn and Schooler (1983);
Putnam et al. (1994): they all claim that culture is almost unmodifiable, even in the long run.
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stance, trust: it is non rival and non-excludable (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000).
Thus there seem perfectly logic that one can change its level of trust whenever
he deserves. If this is not the case, there must exist some barriers or switching
costs, that prevent such changes to occur (Ramsay, 1996). According to Guiso
et al. (2006) there are three complementary causes of cultural persistence.
The first one is that culture is, by and large, transmitted from parents to chil-
dren, i.e., vertically, as opposed to horizontally and obliquely, via social imi-
tation and learning (Berry et al., 2011; Roland, 2015). Parents will naturally
tend to teach their children what they have learned from their own parents,
so that beliefs and values are transmitted “fairly unchanged from generation
to generation”(Guiso et al., 2006, p. 23). Fernàndez et al. (2004); Farré and
Vella (2013), document the important role played by mothers in transmitting
to their sons attitudes favoring both women’s participation in the labor market
and their higher education. Dohmen et al. (2012) document that also trust and
attitudes toward risk are transamitted from parents to children. Epidemiolog-
ical studies are based precisely on the assumption of the existence of a vertical
component in the process of cultural transmission. However, immigrants can
decide to let their children horizontally learn from their peers in the recipient
country, if they believe that this could be useful (Bisin and Verdier, 2005).
The typical example is language adoption, which could help the integration in
the labor market (Reimers, 1985). Thus, it seems that individuals have some
control over what they decide to transmit to their sons (Fernàndez, 2011). Con-
trarywise, sons are undeniably tied to their parents’ culture, even when they
pretend to have broken with the past (Sowell, 1994; Guiso et al., 2003). This
suggests that at least something of what one has learned as a child, remains
imprinted in her/his mindset, possibly unconsciously (Rokeach, 1968, 1973;
Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Hofstede, 1980b,a; Schuman and Scott, 1989; Newton
and Norris, 2000; Mueller and Thomas, 2001; Pinillos and Reyes, 2011) and
could generate what Roland (2015) labels core beliefs and values. Accordingly,
while core beliefs and values represent the pillars of one’s world view and are
therefore more persistent, peripheral beliefs and values are more easily subject
to change. This is an interesting way of merging the fast- and slow-moving
hypothesis which could explain why there is still disagreement about the speed
of cultural change (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).
Secondly, there are some organizations, like the state, the church, and the
academia, that might get a rent from current beliefs and values, and are there-
fore interested in maintaining the cultural status-quo (Guiso et al., 2006; Pinil-
los and Reyes, 2011; Weil, 2013). Moreover, cultural values and beliefs are so
deeply rooted within social institutions that they are continuously reinforced
(Greif, 1994; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Hofstede, 2001; Tabellini, 2008).
Last but not least, cultural norms might remain widespread diffused in the
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population even if their outcomes are, from an economic point of view, inef-
ficient (Guiso et al., 2006). Such cultural norms may well have been efficient
when introduced and they simply continue to be taught by parents because
they have become a sort of tradition (Grusec and Kuczynski, 1997) . Salamon
(1992), for instance, documents how the labor-intensive, low profitable Illinois’
German-Catholic descendant’s crop farming was functional to their high fer-
tility, since it guarantees an employment to their children.
As far as inter-generational cultural change is concerned, within countries
there are differences in cultural values between different age cohorts. They
are mainly due to the macroeconomic conditions that characterize their child-
hood and tend to be persistent during the rest of their life. Using WVS data,
Inglehart and Baker (2000) show that cohort born in periods of economic and
social prosperity trust more and place greater value on self-expression and tol-
erance than those born during periods of economic and social decline. When
the economic and social system of countries experience a collapse (as former
Communist countries did when their political system start to decline), the au-
thors observe that survival is of great importance to people. When improved
living conditions allow people to take survival for granted, they start develop-
ing trust and open-mindedness. In contrast, when survival is at risk, people try
to avoid the unknown and are thus less opened to new ideas. These effects of
economic and social conditions interact with the three main causes of cultural
persistent listed above. The complex interplay of these forces made cultures
move on parallel trajectories rather than converging: different cultures can
respond in a similar way to the same change in macroeconomic conditions,
but given that their starting point is different, they are not moving toward a
unique worldwide culture.
5.3 Culture and economics
As mentioned in the introduction, in recent years a growing number of economists
are trying to shed light on the potential economic effects of culture. Some of
this relations are already well established, like the positive effect of trust on
investments (Zak and Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2008), while in other cases the
evidence is still mixed, e.g. trust and economic growth (Bertrand and Schoar,
2006; Maridal, 2013). The review of the literature reveals at least five eco-
nomic domains on which culture may impact: institutions, economic growth,
financial markets, labor markets and innovation. In an attempt to be as clear
as possible in what follows they are treated separately, but not independently.
Not all the papers here reviewed deal with the causality issue. For those that
do, this section provides the reader also with some basic information about
the identification strategy employed.
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5.3.1 Culture and (formal) institutions
Since institutions6 are set up by individuals, it is reasonable to expect them
to be shaped according to beliefs and values that individuals hold (Berger
and Luckmann, 1966; Meyer, 1986; Greif, 1994; Mokyr, 2016). Consider con-
temporary United States: it is well-known that beside federal laws, there are
state-level laws which may differ substantially from state to state. The origins
of this asymmetry can be traced as back as the seventeenth and eighteenth
century, when different parts of the US where colonized by different waves of
settlers, each with its own culture (Fischer, 1989). However, one may well
argue that immigrants’ culture was, in turn, shaped by the institutional envi-
ronment in which they grew up before moving to the US and so causality goes
both ways: from institutions to culture in the home country, and then from
culture to institutions in the US (Scott, 1995). The idea that institutions gen-
erate culture is in sharp contrast with the evidence of cultural heterogeneity
within national boundaries at the regional level (Putnam et al., 1994; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015). There are several examples of minorities that survive,
along with their languages and cultures, in spite of political states which do
not recognize their ethnic and religious diversity: Basques, Catalans, Corsicans
and Irish Catholics, to cite some of them (Bisin and Verdier, 2005). Moving
to the empirical literature, Licht et al. (2007), show that at the macro level,
societies emphasizing autonomy exhibit better institutions than collectivism.
Intuitively one would probably said the opposite. The main point here is that
autonomy goes along with better institutions because it needs them. Professing
the primacy of individuals’ goals over those of the collectivity, these societies
exhibit a greater demand for individual freedom, clearly defined rights and
stronger constraints to the power of the authorities. Licht et al. (2007) handle
the causality issue employing a 2SLS procedure and two different instruments
in two separate regressions. First of all, they employ a dummy variable taking
value one if the language spoken in the country allows to drop person-indexing
pronouns (“I”, “you”, etc.) in sentences and zero otherwise, adopted from
Kashima and Kashima (1998). The rational is that culture and language co-
evolve and dropping the person-index pronoun is related to less emphasis on
the single individual. 7 Then, based on the empirical evidence that Hofstede’s
individualism and Schwartz’s autonomy are strongly correlated, the second
instrument is a lagged value (30 years prior) of the Hofstede’s individualism
dimension.
6The term institutions must be intended in a broad sense (Acemoglu, 2008), encompassing
political as well as legal and regulatory institutions, alongside with the welfare state.
7A detailed theoretical justification for this instrument is out of the scope of the present paper.
We refer to Licht et al. (2007) for all the details.
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In the same fashion, Schwartz (2004) documents the positive relationship
between autonomy and democracy. In line with theoretical predictions by
Fukuyama (1995), La Porta et al. (1997) find that at the macro level, trust
positively affects several measures of quality of institutions.
5.3.2 Gross Domestic Product
Economic growth and the level of GDP are usually associated with positive at-
titudes toward hard work, saving and education (Minkov and Blagoev, 2009).
Culture can play a role in shaping all of them. Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2017) find that individualism has a positive impact on economic growth both
directly and indirectly, through the effect it has on innovation activity. The
paper deals with the causality issue relying on a 2SLS procedure: individu-
alism is instrumented with the pronoun drop dummy taken from Licht et al.
(2007) as well as with several alternative measures of genetic differences be-
tween populations, taken from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994); Spo (2009); Chiao
and Blizinsky (2009); Way and Lieberman (2010), Red Cross and similar agen-
cies. The theoretical justification for using genetic variables as instruments for
cultural variables is the consideration that both are transmitted from parents
to children and that indeed, culture may be, to some extent, determined by
genes.
Moving to trust, Helliwell (1996); Inglehart and Baker (2000) report its pos-
itive impact on GDP. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) question this relationship:
using WVS data they first show the existence of a strong positive correlation
between trust and GDP per capita, but then they show how this correlation
disappears once a measure of the strength of family ties (based on WVS data)
is included in their regressions model.
Using WVS data, Maridal (2013) tries to identify which cultural traits have the
largest and most significant impact on economic performance, measured as per-
centage level of GDP growth, PPP adjusted, for a sample of low and medium
income countries. The data show that teaching independence and thriftiness
to children, striving for excellence and being honest, all have a positive and
statistically significant impact on economic growth. Their interpretation is
that the first three variables constitute the so-called achievement orientation,
which is important in the production stage of the economy (Fukuyama, 1995).
Honesty, on the other hand, plays an important role in the exchange stage
of the economy. By reducing opportunistic behaviors, honesty breeds trust,
which in turn lowers transaction costs and enlarge markets. Large markets are
the key to the division of labor and thus to productivity gains (Smith, 1776).
Both achievement orientation and honesty are required for economic growth
(Marini, 2004; Maridal, 2013).
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Liñán and Fernandez-Serrano (2014) find that in European countries, cultures
emphasizing autonomy and egalitarianism are more conducive to economic
growth than those based on the unconditional acceptance of the prevailing so-
cietal order.
Following the ideas of Weber, McCleary and Barro (2006) try to assess whether
religion can explain differences in per capita real GDP growth rates in a sam-
ple of 41 countries. Their results suggest that religion overall does not play a
pivotal role in shaping growth patterns of nations. This is due to the fact that
positive effects in terms of honesty, work ethic, thriftiness and openness to
strangers are offset by the resources that the religion sector absorb in order to
produce them. Moreover, doctrines and prescriptions of different religions are
so heterogeneous, that it’s almost impossible to assess a general effect of reli-
gion on behavior, the clearest example being Weber’s theory on Protestantism
(Marini, 2004). McCleary and Barro (2006) deal with the causality issue by
instrumenting religiosity variables (monthly attendance at formal religious ser-
vices and belief in hell) with different exogenous variables that are thought to
affect religiosity: dummy variables for state religion and state regulation of
religion; a religious pluralism indicator and religion adherence shares among
persons adhering to some religion. Data on religiosity and on the instruments
are taken mainly from the WVS and similar surveys. The interested reader
should refer directly to the paper for more information.
Last but not least, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) analyze the impact of
culture on economic performance in roughly 70 countries and find that in-
dividualism, autonomy and egalitarianism all have a positive and significant
impact on output per capita. Conversely, power distance and embeddedness
negatively affect economic performance. The identification strategy employed
is 2SLS and the cultural dimensions are instrumented using the Euclidean
distance of frequencies of blood types (A-type and B-type) between a given
country and the country with the largest value of that specific cultural dimen-
sion. The primary source of data on blood frequencies is Cavalli-Sforza et al.
(1994).
Finally, putting together what already told in Section 5.3.1 about culture and
institutions, with the evidence provided by Barro (1991); Acemoglu et al.
(2002, 2001), that institutions play an important role in explaining long run
growth, one can state that there is also an indirect impact of culture on the
economy: via institutions (North, 1990b,a).
5.3.3 Financial markets
Recalling from Section 4.1 what Smith (1776) and Arrow (1972) wrote about
the role of trust in essentially every market transaction, it is everything but
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surprising to find that trusting individuals are more involved in financial mar-
kets than non-trusting ones (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008). Using data from an
Italian bank customer survey, Guiso et al. (2008) find that also trust in the
financial institution one is relying on for investments plays a role, both in the
decision to invest or not and in the quantity invested. The same results hold
true in cross-country comparisons. Trust impacts also on the decision of en-
trepreneurs to list their companies: low-trusting investors can be attracted in
the stock market only if the returns are disproportionately high compared with
the risks they bear. This, in turn, will discourage entrepreneurs from listing
their companies. In order to invest, one must firstly spare some money, so that
savings are the prerequisite of investments. Guiso et al. (2008) and Minkov
and Blagoev (2009) report that also savings are influenced by culture: the
highest the share of individuals who think that teaching thriftiness to children
is important, the highest the fraction of national savings compared to GDP. At
the macro level, Bertrand and Schoar (2006) document both the negative im-
pact of strong family ties on the dimension of a national stock market (number
of listed firms) and on its concentration (share of market capitalization con-
trolled by top 5 families), while Guiso et al. (2004) show that trust, measured
at the community level, positively affects the probability of signing checks.
Greif (1994) states that a particular cultural trait, namely, individualism has
significantly contributed to the development of financial markets. Looking at
late-medieval Italian city of Genoa, he claims that strong individualism caused
firms to emerge and then to sell their shares to non-family members, giving
birth to stock markets.
5.3.4 Labor markets
Culture is usually taught to affect labor markets through the impact it has
on female participation (Fernàndez and Fogli, 2009). Culture affects wives’
labor participation in two ways. Directly, influencing the allocation of time
between home and market work by women with the same characteristics and
indirectly, through its impact on women’s characteristics, i.e., on education,
number of children (Reimers, 1985; Fernàndez and Fogli, 2009). According
to Papamarcos and Watson (2006) changes in female labor participation have
far-reaching effects on family, workplace, etc (introduction of family-friendly
polices) and the economy (greater talent pool). Culture, however, may well
have an impact also on the participation of males in the labor market. At the
macro level, Yang and Lester (2000) analyze the overall unemployment rate
and find that for their sample of 18 industrialized countries, a high level of
extraversion (lack of socialization) implies that the country will have a high
unemployment rate, since information about job opportunities flows easily
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within well-socialized societies (Weil, 2013). This, together with the evidence
reported in Feingold (1994), that women tend to score higher than men on
extraversion, suggests that extraversion may ultimately account different em-
ployment levels by men and women. There is also another way in which culture
can affect the labor market, namely its impact on the decision of being an em-
ployee or a self-employed (McGrath et al., 1992a; Mueller and Thomas, 2001;
Basu and Altinay, 2002; Vinogradov and Kolvereid, 2007). Culture operates
through two channels, shaping both an environment which can be more or less
supportive for entrepreneurial activity and individual attitudes consistent with
entrepreneurship (Mueller and Thomas, 2001; Liñán and Fernandez-Serrano,
2014). Guiso et al. (2006), for instance, find that at the individual level, trust
positively affects the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. The authors
employ a 2SLS and instrument trust with dummy variables for religious de-
nomination and ethnic origin of individuals. Conversely, Bertrand and Schoar
(2006), find that at the macro level more trust is associated with less self-
employment, unless a measure of the strength of family ties is included in the
regression.
5.3.5 Innovation
Innovation, through its impact on productivity, could play an important role in
explaining why nations differ so widely in terms of income and development. In
order to test this theoretical prediction, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) de-
velop an endogenous growth model and find that individualism provides strong
incentives to innovate and thus spurs long-term growth. At the same time,
collectivism, although generating static efficiency gains, has no growth effect.
From a historical point of view, Greif (1994) reports that the late-medieval
city-State of Genoa was known both for its strong emphasis on the individual
and its innovation activity, thus claiming a causal link between them. Every
innovation has, indeed, a component of risk. Accordingly, Shane (1992) re-
ports that innovation activity is more frequent in low-uncertainty avoidance
countries. Akçomak and Ter Weel (2009); Laursen et al. (2012) believe that
there exists a causal link also between trust/social capital and propensity to
innovate. Circumscribing their analysis to Italian regions, Laursen et al. (2012)
find that firms based in regions with higher levels of localized social capital are
more likely to innovate their products. The paper deals with the causality issue
by implementing 2SLS and using as instruments for trust historical (lagged)
data on literacy rates, universities (periods od existence and density, i.e. nu-
mer of universities per 100.00 inhabitants) and formal institutions (constraints
on the executive).
27
6 A short summary of the major findings
For what has been said so far, culture can influence both institutions and the
economy in several ways. Previous sections provide the reader with numer-
ous examples of such impacts, but they require some time and effort to be
fully understood. In order to simplify the main results of the review of the
literature and to present them in an effective way, we have decided to display
them graphically in Appendix 1. The aim is to show schematically how culture
affects the economy, leaving aside all measurement and methodological issues.
In this section we do not distinguish between analyses at the micro and at
the macro level. Since different authors label and measure similar concepts in
different ways (Atkinson and Butcher, 2003), we have decided to merge both
cultural traits and institutional/economic outcomes into a limited number of
elements, so that what is lost in terms of accuracy is gained in terms of hand-
iness.
Our idea is that there are two macro cultural traits that can shape the devel-
opment of a country (square boxes in Figure 1) and that they can have con-
sequences on five domains (ellipses is Figure 1). Arrows are aimed at showing
the existence of a positive impact of the cultural trait on the specific outcome
it is connected to and list contributions that empirically demonstrate the ex-
istence of such causality.8 Designed this way, the diagram is useful both for a
schematic representation of cultural consequences on the economy and insti-
tutions and for the identification of the relevant literature.
The first cultural trait displayed in Figure 1 deals with the importance of the
individual within the society, of his effort in reaching his own goals, and his
continuous attempts to strive for excellence. The other one groups traits like
respect for others, trust, social capital and equality of opportunities for all.
These two traits impact on the level of economic activity, financial and labor
markets as well as innovation and institutions. The two cultural traits may
seem two polar ends of the same trait, but, in our view, they are not: the im-
portance of the individual and respect for others are not antithetical. In fact,
the literature suggests the opposite: they are simultaneously needed for eco-
nomic development. In the same manner, equality of opportunities is rather
a prerequisite of the importance of individual effort, than a negation of the
same. In conclusion, it seems plausible to say that economic and institutional
development are built upon a society in which individuals are not discrimi-
nated by status, sex and ethnicity, they behave correctly and are expected to
8There are some papers, like Yang and Lester (2000) documenting a negative impact of the
lack of socialization on unemployment. In such situations we have considered that socialization
(intended as part of social capital) positively affects the labor market.
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do so (trust). At the same time they are also encouraged to pursue their own
goals and to do it at the best of their possibilities. Notably, Fukuyama (1995)
recognizes the importance both of achievement orientation in the production
stage of the economy and of trust in the exchange stage.
7 Conclusions, suggestions for future re-
search and recommendations
In recent years culture has finally found its way to enter the economic debate
and it is nowadays hard to deny its importance. If culture can improve the
reliability of economic models, then it leads them to be more useful both in
the comprehension of present and past events and in forecasting future-ones
(Mueller and Thomas, 2001). Understanding how culture interacts with insti-
tutions may help policy-makers to design more effective policies (Papamarcos
andWatson, 2006; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017; Pinillos and Reyes, 2011).
Nevertheless one must always consider that there is a trade-off between accu-
racy and handiness: only cultural traits with high explanatory power should
be included in economic models.
At the same time, many things are still to be done. Mechanisms that gov-
ern cultural change must be unveiled, as well as reasons why there are such
cultural diversities around the word (Mokyr, 2016). Saying that cultural differ-
ences are due to asymmetric cultural evolutionary trajectories is not enough,
the reasons why trajectories have differed must be studied and understood.
Fincher et al. (2008); Chiao and Blizinsky (2009); Way and Lieberman (2010),
for instance, document strong correlations between genetic variables and the
individualist-collectivist nature of a society. Up to now the prevalent idea is
that where individuals are at great risk to suffer from stress and depression
due to genetic predisposition, they tend to develop collectivist societies, which
are more conducive to psychological support in stressful situations. Roland
(2015); Galor and Özaka (2016) state that another possible cause could be
found in geographic endowment. Accordingly, Minkov and Blagoev (2009)
suggest that in the past, individuals in warm climates were not accustomed
at preserving food, due to its abundance. Because of that, this societies do
not develop the concept of putting resources aside for future periods (Weil,
2013), which lead them to have lower saving rates today. For what concerns
cultural change, it may well be a result of cultural adaptation to technological
change (Fernàndez, 2011), contact with other cultures, increasing wealth, new
problems that may arise as time goes by (Schwartz, 2004) and changes in the
environment (Giuliano and Nunn, 2017).
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In spite of all the efforts, we still lack a clear model of culturally-driven eco-
nomic growth (Mokyr, 2016), that could challenge the already established ones,
like the Solow-Swan-Ramsey model.
Next, the issue of interaction between cultural traits must be addressed, and
may help to explain why certain traits affect the economy in one way in some
instances, and in a completely different way in others (Gorodnichenko and
Roland, 2011).
Although culture and education are not synonyms they exhibited similar diffi-
culties in entering the economic discourse, mainly due to problems in measuring
them. One possible path for future research in cultural economics could then
be the inclusion of distributional traits of cultural traits into economic models.
Weil (2013) suggests that cultural heterogeneity within the same country could
severely harm growth.
Another interesting issue that deserves attention is whether the increased glob-
alization and the fast exchange of information made possible by the develop-
ment of the ICT, would lead to a convergence of world cultures. As stated in
Boli and Lechner (2001); Akçomak and Ter Weel (2009), globalization forces
are not new, since they date back to the travels of Christian missionaries. Ac-
cording to modernization theory, economic development should promote the
adoption of modern values and beliefs in all societies, like tolerance and self-
expression. Yet, Inglehart and Baker (2000) provide evidence that the trend
toward modern values is not inevitable, nor irreversible. Rather than con-
verging, societies seem to move on parallel trajectories (Inglehart and Welzel,
2005). Borrowing from geomorphology, one can think of modern values as of
a new cultural stratus, overlaying on previous cultural strata, so that the final
result depends also on what lays below (Massey, 1995; Inglehart and Welzel,
2005).
Furthermore, since authors label differently similar cultural traits, the litera-
ture would certainly benefit from the adoption of a clear and unified language.
Next, given the leading role played by firms in production, it is surprising
that the relation between culture and market structure has not yet attracted
greater attention.
Lastly, we would like to highlight the fact that the field of culture and eco-
nomics is as fascinating as risky. The temptation of ranking different cultures
according to economic efficiency criteria is always around the corner which
is not wrong per se, but should never result in attaching value judgments to
different cultures (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017; Weil, 2013). Cultures
fostering savings, investments and output are not better than others, they are
just more conducive to economic growth (MacIntyre, 1988). Identifying those
cultural traits that boost economic growth is easier said than done. Accord-
ing to Fukuyama (1995) achievement orientation is needed in the production
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stage of the economy. On the other hand, social virtues that create trust are
required in the exchange stage. As shown in the diagram in Appendix 1, both
are important for economic growth (Maridal, 2013). The idea that culture
is not completely under control of individuals, suggests that poor and slow-
growing countries will never improve their conditions. This is not necessarily
true, if one considers that a particular set of cultural values doesn’t need to
generate the same economic consequences in all time periods and all environ-
ments (Papamarcos and Watson, 2006). Technological change, for instance,
can cause some cultural values to fade away as boosters of growth and oth-
ers to emerge (Minkov and Blagoev, 2009). Within this framework, culture
may also account for the so-called growth miracles (Marini, 2004; Weil, 2013).
What makes the framework even more complex is the so-called observer bias
(Weil, 2013) or Halo effect (Rosenzweig, 2007): a situation in which the ob-
server will naturally tend to assess as positive cultures of rich countries, and
as negative those of poor countries, without a full assessment of other possible
explanations. Mill (as reported in Weil, 2013) was convinced that cultural
attributes necessary for economic growth are, actually, distasteful.
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Appendix 1: Schematic representation of cul-
ture’s consequences on the economy
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Fernàndez, R. (2011). Does culture matter? In Benhabib, J., Jackson, M. O.,
and Bisin, A., editors, Handbook of Social Economics, volume 1A, pages
481–510. North Holland.
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We study the impact of social capital on vertical integration using informa-
tion at the four-digit level for manufacturing sectors in 30 European countries.
According to transaction cost theory, firms buy their inputs in the market
rather than produce them internally if they do not fear to be cheated by their
suppliers. Since social capital promotes trust and trustworthiness, we expect
that the higher the level of social capital, the higher the reliance on external
procurement of inputs. This prediction is confirmed by empirical analyses.
Furthermore, we show that the impact of social capital is differentiated among
industrial sectors.
JEL Classifications: L22, D23, A13.
Keywords: Vertical integration, Social capital, Trust, Transaction costs.
1 Introduction
In neoclassical economic models firms are thought to be completely described
by production functions specifying how inputs are transformed into outputs
(Kreps, 1990). The only decision that entrepreneurs/managers have to take
is to set the quantities produced as to maximize profits (Hart, 1995). Unfor-
tunately this modeling tells nothing about the internal organization of firms
and fails to explain why in the real world there are so many different ways of
organizing production. As stated in Coase (1937) and Williamson (1989), one
of the main problems faced by real-world firms is whether to produce their
inputs internally or to buy them in the marketplace. From the point of view of
these authors, firms will choose the cheaper option. Markets may be charac-
terized by the presence of opportunistic individuals, who may fail to keep their
For all the datasets mentioned in the present work, the interested reader must refer directly to
the corresponding terms and conditions available online. The calculations and the conclusion are
the sole intellectual products of the Author.
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promises. The inability of individuals to ex ante identify trustworthy coun-
terparts is a major threat for market transactions (Williamson, 1993; Ghoshal
and Moran, 1996). In such situations, high-costing contractual enforcement
may lead firms to rely on internal production of inputs (Williamson, 1989). If
this is the case, it is important to determine which variables cause such costs to
vary from situation to situation (Williamson, 1979). There is a long-standing
tradition in social sciences pointing at the level of social capital and trust as
potential determinants of costs associated with market transactions (Smith,
1776; Mill, 1848; Banfield, 1958). Surprisingly, the literature on transaction
costs has generally ignored the role of social capital and trust, while empha-
sizing opportunistic behavior, which is rarely observed in reality (Granovetter,
1985; Greif, 1994; Husted and Folger, 2004). A partial explanation is that
social capital is difficult to measure and until recent years no large datasets
were available. Make-or-buy decisions can be also studied using the incomplete
contracts framework (for an overview: Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). Accord-
ing to this literature, ownership of the relevant asset in a transaction should
be attributed to the party that makes the most important investment. Also
within this framework social capital may reduce vertical integration. By in-
ducing individuals to behave correctly, social capital leads asset ownership to
be less relevant and reduces vertical integration. Social capital has proven
to be a powerful explanatory variable in many economic domains, spanning
from government performance (Putnam et al., 1994) and economic growth
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) to innovation (Laursen et al., 2012) and partic-
ipation in financial markets (Guiso et al., 2004). The present paper represents
a first attempt to explicitly test the impact of social capital on vertical inte-
gration. In doing so, it is an answer to the call in Bromiley and Cummings
(1995), that transaction cost economics should extend its research framework
to account also for non purely selfish behavior. While there are studies on
the impact of dyadic buyer-seller trust on procurement decisions, the novelty
of the present paper resides in the inclusion of social capital at the country
level as explanatory variable for vertical integration. In what follows, vertical
integration is measured as the ratio of value added to turnover, as proposed
by Adelman (1955) and employed among others by Laffer (1969) and Pieri
(2018). Laffer (1969) studies how vertical integration evolves over time in the
U.S.. Pieri (2018), on the other hand, shows how vertical integration affects
growth rates of firms in Italy. While most of the classical empirical contribu-
tions focus on single industry case studies and on single countries, the present
paper considers different manufacturing industries in 30 European countries
simultaneously. In the present paper, vertical integration is measured at the
four-digit level for industries belonging to Section C - Manufacturing, as de-
fined in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
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Activities (ISIC) (United Nations. Statistical Division, 2008). Our results con-
firm that countries characterized by higher levels of social capital present less
integrated industries. This relationship is stronger in industries with low levels
of R&D intensity, where the quality of inputs is easy to specify ex-ante and
to evaluate ex-post. Here informal agreements and reliance on counterparts’
trustworthiness can sustain or even substitute contractual agreements easily
than in industries where inputs are so complex as to generate strong market
power for their producers. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 re-
views the literature on vertical integration and on social capital and establishes
the link between the two. Section 3 describes the data that are employed in
this study. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review and theoretical back-
ground
In neoclassical economic models, firms are seen as black boxes , in which in-
puts are transformed into outputs and the whole production process is perfectly
described by a production function, which is in turn determined by the avail-
able technology (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995). The only problem
that firms face is the maximization of profits or, equivalently, the minimiza-
tion of costs at a given production level. One of the major weaknesses of this
approach is that it is unable to explain the boundaries of the firm: both a per-
fectly competitive market and a monopoly are consistent with the neoclassical
theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1989; Hart, 1995). Transaction cost theory
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Klein et al., 1978) arises as a possible response
to this shortcoming. The question that transaction cost economics (TCE) tries
to answer is why firms decide to procure in the market some of their inputs
(buy) and to produce internally (make) others (Coase, 1937). The answer is
strikingly simple: firms choose the cheaper option (Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1989). In principle, it is impossible to say that one of the two options is al-
ways cheaper than the other. Only a detailed analysis of the single transaction
could reveal which of the two is the most profitable for a firm (Williamson,
1976; Gibbons, 2010). If this is the case, it is important to determine why do
transaction costs arise. Transaction costs are mainly due to three transaction
failures. The first one is the impossibility of individuals to write complete
contracts due to their limited rationality or to the prohibitively high costs of
writing them. The second-one is the omnipresent opportunism of individu-
als. Last but not least, in case of disputes between two parties, third parties,
like courts, will be unable to dispense justice costlessly (Williamson, 1975,
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1989; Perry, 1989; Martin, 2009). Due to transaction failures, there may be
incentives for a firm to integrate vertically (Joskow, 1985; Williamson, 1979).
While transaction costs are usually associated with specific investments (those
for which the value in the relationship for which they were designed greatly ex-
ceeds the value outside it), in its original formulation TCE refers generically to
specificity and not strictly to specific investments (Williamson, 1975; Gibbons,
2010). Knowing the transaction counterpart, the timing of the performance
and learning by doing are enough to characterize a relationship as specific and
not easily interchangeable (Williamson, 1975, 1989; Perry, 1989; Masten et al.,
1991; Gibbons, 2010). Furthermore, Williamson (1989), describes transaction
costs as frictions in the process of exchange, that are separate from produc-
tion costs (Perry, 1989). Accordingly, economy is fundamentally a science of
contract and a firm is hardly seen as a mere production function (Commons,
1934; Buchanan, 1975). Moving to the empirical literature, contributions test-
ing the predictions of TCE on vertical integration have a long standing tradi-
tion.1 Starting from the first attempts on petroleum refiners (Teece, 1976), car
manufacturers (Klein et al., 1978; Monteverde and Teece, 1982) and aerospace
industry (Masten, 1984), empirical papers have mainly focused on technolog-
ical determinants of transaction costs. As already mentioned above, however,
transaction costs are far from being completely determined by technological
factors embedded in specific investments. Building on Coase and Williamson,
a series of contributions suggest that integration could arise as a response to
contractual incompleteness when specific investments of one of the transaction
counterparts are particularly important (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). When contracts are incomplete, asset ownership
is a source of power in the transaction, since it determines who can exclude
the other party from using the asset. Asset ownership is defined in terms of
residual rights of control, i.e. the right to decide how to use the asset in case
of unforeseen contingencies. A party that can be excluded from using an asset
will hardly invest on it. Accordingly, ownership should be attributed to the
party whose non-contractible, relation-specific investments are more impor-
tant for the total surplus of the transaction. Also in this theory, as in TCE,
the opportunistic behavior of parties plays a critical role in determining the
make or buy decision. Because of opportunism, it may be sub-optimal to have
a buyer and a seller as stand-alone entities, since they may not have enough
incentives to make investments whose benefits accrue also to the other party.
In such situations, firms may decide to integrate vertically.
In his seminal contribution, Transaction-cost economics: the governance of
contractual relations, Oliver Williamson (1979) points at the identification of
1For an overview of the early contributions, see Shelanski and Klein (1995).
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the dimensions with respect to which transaction costs differ as one of the most
interesting developments of his own theory. Many authors, starting from Smith
(1776) and Mill (1848) and continuing with Weber (1904); Banfield (1958); Ar-
row (1972) and Fukuyama (1995), point at the level of trust as at a potential
source of variability in the costs of managing a transaction. Also the literature
on industrial districts recognizes that trust may influence vertical relationships
between firms (see, for instance: Brusco, 1982). As stated in OECD (2017a,
p. 17): “. . . trust allows people, businesses and organizations to make decisions
without having to renegotiate with . . . their counterparts at each interaction”.
Within economics, trust or, better, generalized trust is usually defined as the
degree of trust a person has towards another (Guiso et al., 2008). When ap-
plied to make or buy decisions, it is probably more appropriate to consider
trust as the willingness of individuals to be vulnerable to others, based on the
presumption that they can rely on the word of their counterparts (Mayer et al.,
1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). As a matter of fact, non-integrated firms are vul-
nerable both to their suppliers and to their buyers. It is legitimate, then, to
imagine that firms’ willingness to be vulnerable will increase as their expec-
tations of not being cheated rises. Globalization is driving enterprises to rely
less on long-term relationships and to search continuously for new, more con-
venient transaction counterparts. Thus, it is not possible to imagine that trust
between firms is developed and reinforced trough a long-standing relationship,
as assumed by the relational contract literature (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996;
Baker et al., 2002). There must be something outside the single relationship
that drives the trusting propensity of managers (McKnight et al., 1998). By
establishing mutual obligations and informal sanctions, social capital enhances
trust, trustworthiness and reciprocity (Putnam et al., 1994; Fukuyama, 1995;
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). As a first approximation one can think of so-
cial capital as of the productive value of social connections.2 As such, a widely
debated point is whether social capital is an attribute of the single individual
or it pertains to the whole society (Bourdieu, 1986; Baker, 1990; Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992; Putnam et al., 1994; Portes, 1998). In the first case, the
social capital of the single individual must be intended as made of networks
and resources available trough network’s membership. In the second case, so-
cial capital is constituted of networks and shared norms. Whichever the case,
social capital can both be beneficial for everyone within the society or can lead
single individuals or small groups to gain at the expenses of the society (Bour-
dieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 2000).
Examples of social capital that are harmful for the society at large are those
2The term productive must be intended in a broad sense, encompassing both market production
and well-being outcomes.
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stemming from networks of terrorists or organized criminals, that are charac-
terized by a strong in-group, out-group dynamic (Portes, 1998). Accordingly,
Gittell and Vidal (1998) recognize two types of social capital: bonding and
bridging.3 In a more formal way, Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 226), define
social capital as “norms and networks that enable people to act collectively”.
A vibrant associational activity is probably the most obvious manifestation of
social capital (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). When individuals interact fre-
quently in different associations, they develop reputation and trustworthiness
that are not limited to interactions within the single association, but become
characteristics of their everyday life (Putnam et al., 1994; Newton and Norris,
2000; Putnam, 2000; Burt, 2005). When interacting in the market, this indi-
viduals may behave correctly up to the point when they give up part of their
material payoffs, because they expect to be rewarded or punished for their be-
havior not only by their transaction counterpart, but also by other members
of the society (Guiso et al., 2004). The theory presented in the present paper
differs from the canonical TCE approach in that it allows for the possibil-
ity that individuals behave correctly, in a non-opportunistic way. Williamson
himself admitted this possibility (Williamson, 1973, 1975, 1985, 1989). He also
makes a step further in this direction by writing that “the propensity for op-
portunism varies among individuals and between cultures”(Williamson, 1996a,
p.50), but did not develop further the topic. Highlighting this shortcoming,
Bromiley and Cummings (1995) suggest that individuals are likely to know ap-
proximately how trustworthy others are. In our framework the level of social
capital provides individuals with an idea about the trustworthiness of others.
The inclusion of social capital in the traditional TCE setting can help to ex-
plain why it is not necessary for a firm to behave opportunistically when given
the opportunity. By reneging a contract a firm may incur two types of costs.
On the one hand, by doing so, a firm is signaling itself as not trustworthy and
this reputation damage can translate into an economic-one, if other firms will
refuse to trade with it in the future (Macaulay, 1963; Ring and Van de Ven,
1992). On the other hand, the owners/managers of the firm may feel uncom-
fortable by reneging a previous contract. Both effects suggest that when a firm
is given the opportunity to cheat, it is facing a trade-off between immediate
economic payoff on the one hand and reputation and psychological payoff on
the other.4 Knowing that the counterpart is less likely to cheat, a firm may
3This distinction will be made clearer in section Section 4. For the time being it is enough
to state that while bridging social capital can be beneficial to the whole society, bonding social
capital is beneficial to members of a restricted group and harmful for out-groups. Unless differently
specified in what follows we refer to the first type of social capital.
4The role played by reputation and economic damages in mitigating opportunism can be ex-
plained also without the inclusion of social capital, in a purely utilitarian way. For the purposes
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not feel the need to write long, detailed contracts and to rely on third-parties
to enforce them (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). Fur-
thermore, information flows easily within high social capital societies, causing
reputation to be well-known among all actors. All this can be synthesized
by saying that social capital reduces transaction costs (Bromiley and Cum-
mings, 1995; Lorenz, 2000). Vertical integration does not completely avoid
inefficiencies: internalizing a transaction does not eliminate the transaction; it
only changes its nature. Instead of exchanging money for goods, the firm is
simply exchanging money for labor services. This new transaction has its own
costs, that must be compared with market ones (Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1985,
1996b, 2002; Kreps, 1990; Gibbons, 2005). Since firms are designed precisely
to minimize opportunistic behaviors within their boundaries, transaction costs
are a major concern for market exchange and less so for exchanges that take
place within firms’ boundaries (Simon, 1951; Williamson, 1975; Ouchi, 1980).
While our discussion has focused on TCE and the impact of social capi-
tal, it deserves to be noticed that our argument falls also in the incomplete
contracts framework (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart,
1995). Incompleteness of contracts constitutes a threat for market exchange
as long as we assume that individuals behave opportunistically. If this is the
case the ownership of the relevant asset in a transaction critically affects the
incentives of transacting parties to make transaction-specific, non-contractible
investments. If, instead, we allow for other-regarding behavior, a transaction
party may invest also in physical assets that it does not own, based on the
presumption that the other party is not going to exclude it from using the
asset. We thus claim that in countries characterized by higher levels of social
capital, ownership of the relevant asset in a transaction is less important than
in countries with low social capital and we shall observe less vertical integra-
tion. The decision to address vertical integration from the point of view of
TCE rests on the idea that the role of social capital in mitigating transaction
costs is intuitive and straightforward. Nevertheless, it fits other frameworks.
The discussion so far has focused on the benefits of vertical integration
compared to non-integration. However, it is worth pointing out some pros of
non-integration, too. To begin with, vertically dis-integrated firms are usually
more efficient, because they can focus on their core activities, at which they
are more productive (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Pieri and Zaninotto, 2013). Fo-
cusing on the Italian automotive sector, Manello et al. (2016) show that total
factor productivity is higher in vertically dis-integrated firms than in more inte-
grated ones. Due to their reduced dimension, vertically dis-integrated firms are
of the present paper, we will consider reputation and economic damages as a consequence of the
inclusion of social capital and we will not enter this debate.
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also able to economize on monitoring and coordination costs (Grossman and
Hart, 1986). Lastly, dis-integrated firms are usually more flexible and respond
quicker to changes in the environment than large, vertically integrated firms
(Kogut and Zander, 1996). Furthermore, markets are more efficient than inter-
nal organization, because they provide high-powered incentives to parties and
can aggregate demands to realize economies of scale and scope (Williamson,
1989). Vertical integration decision thus requires a complex assessment of all
the pros and cons of the different organizational forms. There are some factors
that, according to the traditional TCE and incomplete contracts literature re-
viewed in this section can tip the scales in favor of one of the two solutions.
Vertical integration is more likely to be observed when one of the transacting
parties makes relational-specific, non-contractible investments in physical or
human capital; when the good to be traded is very complex; when there is
a lot of uncertainty regarding the environment in which the trade occurs and
when the frequency of the transaction is low (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and
Hart, 1986). Relational-specific investment are those for which the value inside
the relationship greatly exceeds the value outside it. The party that makes
such investments is subject to the so-called hold-up problem: the other party
can renegotiate the terms of the contract at its own advantage. This is due to
the fact that after the investment has been made, it is a sunk cost for the in-
vesting party and refusing to renegotiate the contract can lead to even greater
financial losses. Anticipating this, the party that must invest refuses to do so.
In such a setting, vertical integration may overcome this problem by unifying
the two parties under the same ownership (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and
Hart, 1986). When the object of the transaction is very complex or there is
a lot of uncertainty regarding the environment in which the transaction takes
place, it is (almost) impossible to design a contract describing all the details
of the good to be traded and considering all possible factors external to the
relationship that can modify the terms of trade. For instance, a selfish sup-
plier interested in maximizing its own profits, may reduce its costs by using
low-quality materials (if they are not specified precisely in the contract) or
claim that external causes (like an increase in the price of raw materials) made
its costs to rise. If this is the case, then the buyer may prefer to integrate
the production of the input. Lastly, opportunism is of great concern when the
transaction is occasional. Contrariwise, if the parties interact frequently, op-
portunism may be mitigated by the monetary value of future transactions with
the same commercial partner (Baker et al., 2002). By inducing market play-
ers to behave correctly, social capital downplays the role of these factors. By
promoting rules of good conduct, social capital decreases the likelihood that a
party will try to renegotiate a contract at the expenses of the other. Likewise,
social capital reduces the need to specify every detail of the traded good and
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every possible state of the world in a formal contract, since both parties rely
on the good faith of the other to solve minor issues that may arise as time goes
by. Last but not least, social capital reduces opportunistic behavior even in
one-shot interactions. Shelanski and Klein (1995) review empirical contribu-
tions in TCE and find that the evidence overall supports the prediction of the
theory, but sometimes data fail to support TCE. They report that occasionally
market is observed, when theory predicts vertical integration (complex deals,
specific investments etc.). Although further analyses are needed to support
our hypothesis, we imagine that social capital can help to solve this puzzle. A
supplier-buyer relationship which involves, say, the same specific investment
may result in vertical integration in a country with low social capital and in
market transaction in a country with a high level of social capital. The same
hold true for complexity, uncertainty and frequency of the transaction. Thus,
holding specificity, complexity, uncertainty and frequency constant, we claim
that the organizational form of a supplier-buyer relationship can be influenced
by the socio-cultural environment in which it takes place. Ceteris paribus we
expect to have more market transactions where social capital is high.
There are two papers which are quite close in spirit to our analysis: Gil
and Hartmann (2011) and Litvinova and Segnana (2015). In the first paper,
the authors analyze the make-or-buy decision of laundries in western Los An-
gles focusing on the Korean community. They find that laundries belonging
to Korean individuals are less likely to integrate vertically. Members of the
Korean community can easily gain information about suppliers’ trustworthi-
ness from other members of the community and are thus more likely to rely
on external provision for their inputs. Our analysis differ from the one in Gil
and Hartmann (2011) in a couple of important ways. First of all, we do not
limit our attention to one industry. Instead, we investigate the effects of social
capital in all manufacturing sectors. Secondly, we are not concerned with one
specific ethnicity as Gil and Hartmann (2011) do, but consider social capital
at the level of the whole population. Thus, our paper generalizes the findings
in Gil and Hartmann (2011) through a more aggregated analysis. Litvinova
and Segnana (2015) study vertical integration in transition countries and find
that trust reduces vertical integration. There are at least two major differ-
ences between their paper and our analysis. To begin with, they focus only
on transition countries, while we find that the effect of social capital is not
limited to such countries, but applies also in more developed-ones. Secondly,
their proxy for trust differs significantly from our measure of social capital.
Accordingly, they measure trust using data on the diffusion of prepayments
in buyer-seller relationships. Such kind of trust is dyadic in nature and may
well be determined by other factors, such as habits or liquidity constraints of
the input producer. As it will be made clearer later in the paper, our measure
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refers instead to the level of social capital (and trust) prevailing at the level of
the broader society.
3 Data
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the impact of social capital on verti-
cal integration. Our dataset includes information on 30 European countries
and 46 sectors classified at the four digit level. Since data for every sector
are not available in every country, on the whole, our dataset contains 974 ob-
servations. The literature has proposed several different methods to measure
vertical integration, each with its pros and cons (Perry, 1989; Acemoglu et al.,
2009). In our analyses, vertical integration is measured using the Adelman
index, adapted to fit the available data. In its original version, the Adelman
index is defined as the ratio of value added to sales at the firm level (Adel-
man, 1955). Due to data availability in the present paper it is measured as
the ratio of value added to turnover at the industry level. The index varies
between 0 (complete vertical disintegration) and 1 (complete vertical inte-
gration) and its value grows with vertical integration. The rationale is that
vertically disintegrated firms buy their inputs in the market and thus their
contribution to the total value added of their output is lower compared to
a situation in which they produce them internally (Pieri, 2018). The Adel-
man index has been employed in several studies both at the firm level and
at the industry level (Laffer, 1969; Levy, 1985; Arrighetti, 1999; Pieri, 2018).
Others, like Manello et al. (2016) and Devicienti et al. (2017) employ a sim-
ilar measure which is computed as the ratio of external costs to total costs.
As for the Adelman index, the idea is that the more a firm produces its in-
puts internally (i.e. the more it is vertically integrated), the lower the ratio
of external costs to total costs. In the present paper data to construct the
Adelman index come from the OECD Structural and Demographic Business
Statistics (SDBS)-Business Statistics for Employment Size Class (BSC) for the
year 2013. The SDBS-BSC provides data on value added at factor costs and
turnover for member countries, at a four-digit ISIC (Rev.4) level. The data
are themselves taken from different original sources and then converted to
ISIC Rev.4: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database, Turkish
Statistical Institute (TurkStat), Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Istat), Hun-
garian Central Statistical Office (www.ksh.ku) and Swiss Federal Statistical
Office. Data on social capital are taken from the fourth wave of the Euro-
pean Values Study (EVS). In line with previous researches on the topic, social
capital is defined in terms of participation in voluntary organizations (Putnam
et al., 1994; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005; Kaasa,
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2009; Laursen et al., 2012). Since there is no legal or economic incentive to
participate in such organizations, membership is driven only by inner motives
(Guiso et al., 2004). The precise definition of our primary measure of social
capital, Civic Engagement, can be found in Table 1, along with other prox-
ies for social capital, that are used later in the paper to check the robustness
of the results. Three of the measures in Table 1 are based on organizational
membership5 and one on trust, fairness and helpfulness, respectively6. The
literature often distinguishes between two dimensions of social capital (each
with its own measures): the structural and the relational-one (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal, 1998; Laursen et al., 2012). The structural dimension refers to the
presence or absence of network ties between individuals, to their configuration,
morphology and extension. The relational dimension refers instead to those
assets created and leveraged trough relationships, like trust, trustworthiness
and reciprocity. To put it in an informal way, the structural dimension informs
us about the existence of a relation (who knows whom), while the relational
dimension describes the type of the relation (what the parties expect from each
other). Among the measures listed in Table 1, those based on involvement in
organizations capture the structural dimension of social capital, while trust,
helpfulness and fairness refer to the relational dimension (Putnam et al., 1994;
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Inglehart, 1997; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000;
Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005; Akçomak and
Ter Weel, 2009; Laursen et al., 2012). As it is mainstream in research on social
capital, our primary measure of social capital, Civic Engagement, is a proxy for
the structural dimension (Coleman, 1988; Putnam et al., 1994; Portes, 1998;
Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Laursen et al., 2012). Measures of the structural
dimension of social capital are often considered more suitable that those built
on the relational dimension, also because they are based on questions that are
less subject to response biases and heuristics (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002;
Laursen et al., 2012; OECD, 2017b). Accordingly, our results show a stronger
impact of structural measures on vertical integration.
Table 2 lists the variables collected for the baseline model, their descriptive
statistics, the units in which they are expressed, as well as their source, the
year to which they refer and whether they are measured at the country level
or at the level of industries within countries. The Adelman index of verti-
cal integration, AdT, is measured at the four-digit industry level, while other
variables are measured at the country level. Civic Engagement is measured
5Since one can argue that powerful trade unions reduce the propensity of firms to grow, both
vertically and horizontally, in some robustness check (not included), trade unions were omitted
from the list of organizations and the results (available upon request) were basically the same.
6For the moment being we leave aside the last two dimensions.
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Variable Source Wording of the question* Aggregation measure
Civic Engagement EVS, 4th wave “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say
which, if any, do you belong to?” (welfare organization; religious organization; cultural
activities; trade unions; political parties/groups; local community action; 3w-development/
human rights; environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations; youth work;
sports recreation; women groups; peace movements; voluntary health; other groups)
Percentage of respondents belonging to at least
one group
Average org. memb. EVS, 4th wave “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say
which, if any, do you belong to?” (welfare organization; religious organization; cultural
activities; trade unions; political parties/groups; local community action; 3w-development/
human rights; environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations; youth work;
sports recreation; women groups; peace movements; voluntary health; other groups)
Average number of organizations respondents
belong to
No org. memb.** EVS, 4th wave “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say
which, if any, do you belong to?” (none)
1-Percentage of respondents stating that they do not
belong to any organization
Active membership EVS , 4th wave “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say
a) which, if any, do you belong to? b) which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid
voluntary work for?” (welfare organization; religious organization; cultural activities; trade
unions; political parties/groups; local community action; 3w-development/
human rights; environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations; youth work;
sports recreation; women groups; peace movements; voluntary health; other groups)
Percentage of respondents belonging to and
working unpaid for at least one group
Trust ESS, 6th wave “Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where
0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.”
Weighted average score from ESS
Helpful ESS, 6th wave “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly
looking out for themselves?” (0(People mostly look out for themselves)-10(People mostly
try to be helpful))
Weighted average score from ESS
Fair ESS, 6th wave “Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” (0(Most people try to take advantage of me)
-10(Most people try to be fair))
Weighted average score from ESS
Bridging Social Capital EVS, 4th wave “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say
which, if any, do you belong to?” (religious organization; cultural activities; youth work;
sports recreation; and women groups)
Percentage of respondents belonging to at least
one group
Bonding Social Capital EVS, 4th wave “Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life.” (family; friends and
acquaintances)
Percentage of respondents answering that at least
one of the two is very important
* Questions are taken from and from European Values Study (2008); European Social Survey (2012).
**Due to inconsistencies in answers provided by respondents, the percentage of individuals responding that they belong to at least one group and the percentage of those saying that they do not belong
to any, do not sum up to 100.
Table 1: Description of social capital measures.
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Statistic N* Mean St. Dev. Min Max Measurement unit Source Year Level
AdT** 974 0.281 0.131 0.000 1.000 Ratio OECD SDBS-BSC*** 2013 Industry
Civic Engagement 30 0.420 0.223 0.107 0.929 Ratio EVS 2008 Country
GDPpc 30 33.138 14.905 12.409 79.849 2011 US
(current PPPs)
Penn World Table 2013 Country
Population 30 19.744 24.866 0.545 80.566 Millions Penn World Table 2013 Country
EnfC 30 21.173 7.128 9.700 39.900 Ratio The World Bank -
Doing Business
2013 Country
TaxH 30 181.550 82.108 59.000 436.000 Hours/year The World Bank -
Doing Business
2013 Country
Cred 30 95.273 50.168 33.858 253.574 Ratio The World Bank -
WDI****
2013 Country
*Note: The number of observations is 974 for AdT, which is defined at the industry level and 30 for variables at the country
level.
**Note: 8 observations were omitted because they did not belong to the closed interval [0,1] and were thus considered as
measurement errors.
***Note: The OECD takes the data for the construction of the database from: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS)
database, Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Istat), Hungarian Central Statistical Office
(www.ksh.ku) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
**** Note: the WB takes the data for the construction of this variable from: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics and data files, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.
Table 2: Summary statistics and additional information.
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as the percentage of individuals belonging to at least one of the organizations
listed in Table 2. Civic Engagement varies significantly from country to coun-
try, with Northern-ones characterized by higher levels than Southern-ones. At
the country level, the smallest value of the Adelman index can be found in
Lithuania (almost 0.15) and the largest in Switzerland (0.34). Furthermore,
vertical integration varies significantly also at the level of industrial sectors
within countries: the average vertical integration in Sector 1 is lower than in
the other two. Sector 1 is made up of traditional sectors (e.g. manufacture of
food products, beverages and textiles) compared to the other two. As will be
made clearer in Section 4.1, it may be the case that vertical integration goes
hand in hand with the complexity of the production technologies involved in a
specific industrial sector. Civic Engagement and country level AdT display a
positive correlation of 0.313.7 However, as it will be clear from next sections,
once more dis-aggregated data and control variables are taken into consider-
ation, the relationship between this two variables becomes negative. This is
a well known problem in the literature, labeled ecological fallacy (Piantadosi
et al., 1988). Accordingly, when considering group averages instead of indi-
vidual observations, the true relationship between variables may be hidden.
Furthermore, for vertical integration measures, Acemoglu et al. (2009) doc-
ument that at the country level, cross-country differences are mainly due to
diverse industrial composition.
The regression analyses also include a series of controls. These variables
are selected as to reflect those already employed in other studies about the
determinants of vertical integration. In detail, Gross Domestic Product per
capita (in thousands) and Population (in milions) should capture the effects of
countries’ stage of economic development and dimension on vertical integra-
tion (Stigler, 1951; Perry, 1989; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Acemoglu et al.,
2009). The next two variables are aimed at controlling for the complexity of
the legal and bureaucratic systems of countries. Many authors interpret verti-
cal integration as a way to avoid costly contractual enforcement (Williamson,
1989). We have thus included in our analyses a measure of how costly it is for
firms to enforce contractual obligations. The variable EnfC is defined as the
ratio of costs for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance
court, over the claim value. The number of hours firms’ employees, on aver-
age, spend in paying taxes (TaxH) is included as an additional control for the
complexity of the bureaucratic system (Acemoglu et al., 2009). Furthermore,
if we imagine that the larger a firm, the more fiscal duties it must fulfill, a
high average value of TaxH may discourage firms from growing, both horizon-
7If we consider AdT at the one-digit level, we get that Sector 1 is negatively correlated with
Civic Engagement, while the other two sectors continue to display a positive correlation coefficient.
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tally and vertically. Lastly, the domestic credit to private sector expressed as
percentage of GDP (Cred) captures the effects of credit markets on vertical in-
tegration (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Pieri, 2018). Still,
there can be substantial difference in the degree of vertical integration between
industries, hence dummies for one-, two- or four-digits level industries are in-
cluded in some of the specifications (Acemoglu et al., 2009, 2010; Pieri, 2018).
The sample includes the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.8
4 Empirical analyses
As argued above, the aim of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of social cap-
ital on vertical integration. Specifically, we estimate the following econometric
model:9
AdT ij = µi + ↵Social capitalj +  
>Xj + ✏ij , (1)
where i and j index industrial sectors and countries, respectively. AdTij is the
Adelman index of vertical integration for the i -th sector in the j -th country;
Social capitalj is a proxy for the level of social capital of a country, Xj is
a vector of controls at the country level. The intercept, µi, varies at the
industry level (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). A first issue is to choose between
models with fixed effects and those with random effects for industrial sectors.
The Hausman test for fixed effects (p-value 0.9984) for the most complete
specification of the model (all controls plus dummies defined at the four-digits
level) clearly suggests that a fixed effect model is more suitable to describe our
data, compared to one with random effects (Greene, 2018)10. Unless differently
specified, our models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
8For some variables, data for the United Kingdom were not available and have been computed
aggregating those for Great Britain and for Northern Ireland. More information available from the
author.
9Since the variables employed in the present paper differ in terms of measurement units and
magnitude, the regression results refer to standardized variables with zero mean and unit standard
deviation.
10Models with random intercepts were estimated using Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML),
as described in Pinheiro and Bates (2000) and McCulloch and Searle (2001) and lead to similar




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Civic Engagement 0.089⇤⇤⇤ −0.035 −0.118⇤⇤ −0.101⇤ −0.089⇤ −0.104⇤⇤ −0.105⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.049) (0.042) (0.039)
GDPpc 0.158⇤⇤⇤ 0.131⇤⇤ 0.089 0.073 0.093⇤⇤ 0.091⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.051) (0.044) (0.041)
Population −0.059⇤ −0.066⇤ −0.070⇤⇤ −0.076⇤⇤ −0.076⇤⇤⇤ −0.070⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025)
EnfC 0.056⇤ 0.059⇤ 0.053⇤ 0.057⇤⇤ 0.061⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025)
TaxH −0.159⇤⇤⇤ −0.119⇤⇤⇤ −0.108⇤⇤ −0.110⇤⇤⇤ −0.111⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033)
Cred 0.121⇤⇤⇤ 0.118⇤⇤⇤ 0.113⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.034) (0.029) (0.027)
ISIC no no no no 1-digit 2-digits 4-digits†
Observations 974 974 974 974 974 974 974
R2 0.008 0.019 0.037 0.048 0.185 0.413 0.516
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.016 0.032 0.042 0.178 0.398 0.489
Residual Std. Error 0.997 0.992 0.984 0.979 0.907 0.776 0.715
(df = 972) (df = 970) (df = 968) (df = 967) (df = 965) (df = 948) (df = 922)
F Statistic 7.735⇤⇤⇤ 6.192⇤⇤⇤ 7.501⇤⇤⇤ 8.148⇤⇤⇤ 27.384⇤⇤⇤ 26.702⇤⇤⇤ 19.288⇤⇤⇤
(df = 1; 972) (df = 3; 970) (df = 5; 968) (df = 6; 967) (df = 8; 965) (df = 25; 948) (df = 51; 922)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Intercepts omitted. Industry dummy variables in columns 5-7 omitted. Models estimated via OLS.
†Due to data availability, there is only one sector at the 4-digits level within each sector defined at 3-digits. Models with 3-digits are
equivalent to those with 4-digits and are omitted.
Table 3: Baseline regression results.
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Table 3 contains the most parsimonious specification in column 1, i.e. the
one with Civic Engagement as the only dependent variable. The other regres-
sors are included in columns 2-4. Column 2 considers controls for countries’
stage of economic development and dimension. Column 3 adds controls for
the complexity of the legal and bureaucratic systems of countries. Finally,
column 5 controls also for the effect of credit market. Columns 5-7 contain
the whole set of regressors, including dummy variables at the industry level
defined at the one-,two- and four-digits level, respectively. In column 1 the
effect of Civic Engagement on AdT is positive and significant. As can be seen
in column 2, once Gross Domestic Product per capita and Population are in-
cluded as controls, the sign associated with Civic Engagement switches from
positive to negative, albeit not significant. This switch in sign means that the
raw correlation between Civic Engagement and vertical integration ultimately
passes trough the positive effect of social capital on GDPpc and of the latter
on the Adelman index. When we control for the complexity of the legal and
bureaucratic system, Civic Engagement significantively reduces vertical inte-
gration. According to TCE, the more costly it is for firms to enforce contracts
trough a court, the more likely it is that they opt for vertical integration. By
inducing individuals to behave correctly, social capital reduces the likelihood
that courts are involved in commercial disputes. Once we control for the dif-
ferent legal and bureaucratic systems of countries, Civic Engagement explains
vertical integration on top of EnfC and TaxH. Since a given industrial sec-
tor at the four-digit level is nested within a particular sector defined at the
three-, two- and one-digit, the structure of the data is a multilevel-one, where
the grouping factor is represented by industrial sectors.11. Columns 5-7 Ta-
ble include fixed-effects models for industrial sectors. Once we control for the
full-set of regressors, Civic Engagement negatively affects the degree of verti-
cal integration, thus confirming our hypothesis that vertical integration could
be interpreted as a way of reducing uncertainty in low-trusting environments.
A one standard deviation increase in Civic Engagement reduces the value of
the Adelman index by, approximately, one tenth of its standard deviation. As
far as control variables are of concern, GDPpc presents a positive coefficient,
although not always significant. Smaller countries in terms of population have
more vertically integrated firms, probably because there is no room for special-
ized producers of inputs, in line with Acemoglu et al. (2009). Very expensive
enforcement of contractual agreements will rise the incentives to vertically in-
tegrate, as predicted by TCE (Acemoglu et al., 2009). The amount of time
11Due to data availability, there is only one sector at the four-digits level within each sector
defined at three-digits. Models with three-digits are equivalent to those with four-digits and are
omitted.
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that employees spent paying taxes (TaxH), decreases the degree of vertical in-
tegration. This is due to the fact that complex fiscal systems discourage firm’s
growth, as the administrative burden associated with it grows with firm’s size,
be it vertical or horizontal. The positive coefficients associated with Cred
are in line with previous findings suggesting that vertical integration is more
prevalent in countries with highly developed credit markets (Acemoglu et al.,
2009). For the more complete models (columns 5-7), the confidence intervals
for Civic Engagement at the 0.95 confidence level do not cross the zero in two
out of four models (ISIC 2-digits and ISIC 4-digits), suggesting a sound effect
of Civic Engagement on vertical integration. In these models, residuals are
normally distributed and the assumption of homoscedasticy and linearity of
the residuals met. As far as influential cases are of concern and according to
the measure proposed by Cook and Weisberg (1982), there are no observations
exerting undue influence on the parameters of the model. Furthermore, the
VIFs are never greater than 5, so that multicollinearity does not seem to be a
problem (Hair et al., 2009).
4.1 Robustness and extensions
To test the stability of the results, we have performed several additional re-
gressions, using different explanatory variables.
To begin with, Table 4 displays OLS estimates obtained using different
measures of social capital (for more information on how they have been con-
structed, see Table 1). All the models include industry fixed-effects. First
of all, by looking at the first six columns it is possible to assess that struc-
tural measures of social capital show a larger and more significant impact on
vertical integration than relational measures.12 Some authors, like Selle and
Strømsnes (2001), have argued that it is not passive membership that matters
for social capital and that active involvement is a better proxy for it. Thus,
we have constructed a measure of active participation in organization, in line
with Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005), but found no statistically significant
effect on vertical integration.13
The literature often distinguishes between two distinct types of social capi-
tal: bridging and bonding (Gittell and Vidal, 1998). Accordingly, while bridg-
ing social capital facilitates cooperation and the diffusion of trust, bonding
12For an explanation of the difference between the two, see Section 3.
13As additional robustness checks, regressions have been run also by omitting non responses
to questions on trust, helpfulness and fairness. The same has been done also for data on trust,
helpfulness and fairness from the 4th wave of the European Values Study. The results are almost




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Average org. memb. −0.099∗∗∗
(0.034)










Bridging Soc K −0.086∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
Bonding Soc K 0.066∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.034) (0.034)
GDPpc 0.082∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.022 0.090∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.074∗ −0.006 0.046
(0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039)
Population −0.075∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.035 −0.062∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
EnfC 0.065∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
TaxH −0.097∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.056 −0.094∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Cred 0.120∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
ISIC 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits
Observations 974 941 902 963 963 963 974 974 974
R2 0.517 0.524 0.509 0.525 0.524 0.526 0.516 0.514 0.519
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.496 0.480 0.498 0.497 0.500 0.489 0.487 0.492
Residual Std. Error 0.714 0.710 0.721 0.699 0.700 0.698 0.715 0.716 0.713
(df = 922) (df = 889) (df = 850) (df = 911) (df = 911) (df = 911) (df = 922) (df = 922) (df = 921)
F Statistic 19.335∗∗∗ 19.168∗∗∗ 17.310∗∗∗ 19.704∗∗∗ 19.643∗∗∗ 19.825∗∗∗ 19.245∗∗∗ 19.143∗∗∗ 19.115∗∗∗
(df = 51; 922) (df = 51; 889) (df = 51; 850) (df = 51; 911) (df = 51; 911) (df = 51; 911) (df = 51; 922) (df = 51; 922) (df = 52; 921)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Measures of social capital are not available for every country, thus the number of observations differ between models.
Intercepts and industry dummy variables omitted. Models are estimated via OLS.










Civic Engagement −0.107∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗





GDPpc 0.103∗ 0.062 0.074∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.123 ∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗
(0.056) (0.053) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.146)
Population −0.069∗∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.134
(0.034) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) (0.031) (0.090)
EnfC 0.059∗ 0.048 0.087∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ −0.013 0.094∗
(0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.056)
TaxH −0.113∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.061 −0.204∗∗
(0.046) (0.044) (0.032) (0.033) (0.051) (0.085)
Cred 0.106∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.067)
Civic Engagement× R&D 0.139∗∗
(0.062)
ISIC no no 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits 4-digits
Observations 947 974 943 943 743 974
R2 0.059 0.123 0.524 0.526 0.544 0.474
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.116 0.496 0.499 0.510 0.445
Residual Std. Error 0.973 0.940 0.688 0.686 0.700 0.745
(df = 939) (df = 965) (df = 891) (df = 890) (df=690) (df=922)
F Statistic 8.477∗∗∗ 16.960∗∗∗ 19.210∗∗∗ 19.031∗∗∗ 15.84∗∗∗ n.a.
(df = 7; 939) (df = 8; 965) (df = 51; 891) (df = 52; 890) (df = 52; 690) n.a.
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Data on Capital intensity are not available for sector 3320 (Installation of industrial machinery and equipment), because does not belong
to manufacturing according to the NAICS classification. Data on Uncertainty avoidance are not available for Cyprus and for Macedonia.
Data on Human Capital are not available for Germany, Spain, UK, Croatia, Macedonia, Netherlands and Portugal.
Intercepts and industry-sector dummy variables (where included) omitted. First five models are estimated via OLS. Model 6 is estimated
with 2SLS; its standard errors are computed using non-parametric bootstrapping with 10000 replications.
Table 5: Robustness: Capital intensity, R&D, human capital and instrumental vari-
ables.
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social capital, by promoting rules of good conduct only within narrowly de-
fined circles of relatives and friends, is detrimental to trust (Banfield, 1958;
Paxton, 2002). Therefore, while bridging social capital should reduce vertical
integration, the opposite holds true for bonding social capital. To see whether
this is the case, we have constructed one proxy for each of the two dimensions
of social capital, using the measures suggested in Beugelsdijk and Smulders
(2003). Data are again taken from the EVS. In detail, bridging social capital
is defined as the percentage of individuals that belong to at least one of the
following types of organizations: religious, cultural, youth work, sports and
women’s groups. Bonding social capital is instead proxied using questions on
the importance of family and of friends and acquaintances. Our measure of
bonding social capital corresponds to the percentage of individuals responding
“very important”to at least one of this two questions. Results are reported
in the last three columns of Table 4. As expected, bridging social capital, by
promoting cooperation and norms of good behavior, reduces the need for ver-
tical integration. On the other hand, bonding social capital, causing distrust
to reign in the society, leads firms to rely more on internal production for their
inputs.14
Table 5 contains some extensions to the baseline results obtained in Table
3. All models are estimated via OLS, except from the one in column 6 which
is estimated via two stage least squares (2SLS). In the first column the regres-
sion results are obtained using capital intensity at the industry level instead of
dummy variables to control for heterogeneity in industrial sectors. As in Ace-
moglu et al. (2009), this measure is taken from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database, as described in Bartelsman et al. (2000).15 The effect of
Civic Engagement on vertical integration continues to be significantly negative
also in this specification. Furthermore, the associated coefficient remains al-
most the same as in previous models. The negative coefficient associated with
Capital intensity is a little bit puzzling to us. The theory would have sug-
gested more capital intensive industries to be more integrated (Williamson,
1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Our result could be due to the fact that we
have data for the US only. Another possibility is that, rather than capturing
14Regressions with different proxies also for quality of institutions and for credit market have
been estimated. Since the results are the same as in the baseline regression, they have been omitted
but are available from the author upon request.
15Capital intensity is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to employees. Data are available only
for the US, so that we are implicitly assuming that the ratio for the US is valid in all countries, as
in Acemoglu et al. (2009). Data on capital intensity in NBER-CES refer to NAICS classification,
while those employed in the present paper are built considering the ISIC classification. NAICS
industries are transformed into the corresponding ISIC-ones defined in United Nations. Statistical
Division (2008). More information available from the author upon request.
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asset specificity, our measure simply proxies the capital requirements specific
to each sector. The more capital is required in a sector, the more expensive it
is to integrate vertically into more phases of production and the less vertically
integrated the sector will be.
Column 2, instead investigates whether the effect of social capital is con-
tingent to the R&D intensity of the sector. Sectors characterized by medium,
high or medium-high levels of research and development intensity (R&D=1),
as defined in Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016), present higher overall levels of
vertical integration16 and the impact of social capital in this sectors is consid-
erably smaller, compared to those with lower levels of R&D intensity. A one
standard deviation increase in Civic Engagement reduces vertical integration
by one sixth of its standard deviation in sectors characterized by low R&D
intensity and only by less than one twenty-fifth of its standard deviation in
R&D-intensive ones. Our tentative interpretation is that in R&D intensive
sectors the characteristics of the inputs to be traded may be subject to fre-
quent changes precisely due to high R&D activity, their quality may be difficult
to evaluate and this may generate strong market power for the supplier. In
such sectors, users may prefer to produce inputs internally and only a huge
increase in social capital can reduce vertical integration (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972; Ouchi, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Levy, 1985; Masten, 1984; Ring
and Van de Ven, 1992; Gulati, 1995; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007).17 Further-
more, a strong emphasis on R&D may cause also the internal organization
of firms to change as new technologies become available. Such changes may
require that also the inputs are immediately adapted, which may be difficult
if the characteristics of the input are to be renegotiated with the transaction
counterpart.
If social capital and trust are substitutes for formal contracts, as suggested
by Granovetter (1985) and Fukuyama (1995), an increase in the quality of
contractual enforcement should have a smaller impact in high-R&D intensity
manufacturing sectors than in low-R&D intensity ones for reasons explained
above with reference to social capital. Regression results confirm that a reduc-
tion in the costs of enforcing contracts (EnfC), will decrease vertical integration
more in low-R&D sectors than in high-R&D sectors.18
Vertical integration can be also seen as a mean for firms to reduce uncer-
tainty in the market for inputs. To check if the relationship between social
16In Section 3 we showed that Sector 1 is less vertically integrated than the other two. According
to Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016), sectors belonging to Sector 1 are also the ones with the lowest
level of R&D intensity.
17Similar results are obtained also with other taxonomies; results are available from the author
upon request.
18Regression results omitted, but available from the author upon request.
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capital and vertical integration does not ultimately pass trough uncertainty
avoidance, a proxy for uncertainty avoidance has been added to the baseline
regression, as in Nooteboom et al. (1997). The chosen measure, UncA, is
taken from Hofstede and Hofstede (2010). The higher its value, the greater
the propensity of people to avoid ambiguous situations. Civic Engagement and
UncA are negatively correlated (correlation coefficient= -0.6). As reported in
column 3 of Table 5, when we substitute Civic Engagement with UncA in our
baseline regression, it has a positive and (weakly) significant impact on AdT.
When, instead, we include both Civic Engagement and UncA, the former con-
tiunes to significatively impact AdT, while the latter does not. Furthermore,
the inclusion of UncA does not change significatively the coefficient associated
with Civic Engagement.19 Column 5 in Table 5 adds a measure of human
capital at the national level to the list of control variables. The proxy chosen
is the lower secondary completion rate expressed as percentage of the relevant
age group for year 2013, taken from The World Bank (2013d).20 On the one
hand, the literature suggests that social capital contributes to the accumu-
lation of human capital (Coleman, 1988). On the other hand, some authors
have proposed to consider the investment in human capital as any other form of
specific investment, which makes vertical integration more likely (Klein et al.,
1978; Masten et al., 1991). If this is the case, then Human Capital should dis-
play a positive regression coefficient, while Civic Engagement should display
a negative coefficient, which should be larger (in absolute terms) than in the
baseline regression.21 As can be seen from column 5 in Table 5, the effect of
Human Capital on vertical integration is not significantly different from zero.
However, we find evidence for the second prediction, that by controlling for
Human Capital, the coefficient associated with Civic Engagement grows (in
absolute terms).
So far, implicitly, it has been taken for granted that the causality flows from
social capital to vertical integration. However, even if the regression results
confirm this hypothesis, it is still possible that the causality flows both ways or,
worse, only from vertical integration to social capital. The literature usually
relies on the instrumental variable approach to deal with this causality issue
19Chen et al. (2002) suggests that transaction costs and vertical integration can vary according to
the Individualism-Collectivism dimension identified by Hofstede. Still, when adding this dimension
to the baseline regression, we found no evidence of such relationship. Results available from the
author upon request.
20The World Bank itself takes the data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics
(http://uis.unesco.org/). We have also run regression with other proxies and get essentially
the same results. Results available from the author upon request.
21This is due to the fact that we are removing from the coefficient associated with Civic Engage-
ment the positive effect mediated by Human Capital.
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(Guiso et al., 2006; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2017). Furthermore,
the instrumental variable approach helps us to deal with another potential
problem of our analyses, namely that the results can be biased due to omitted
variables. As a matter of fact, we do not have regressors that vary simul-
taneously at the industry and at the country country level and we are also
abstracting from many country-level characteristics that may influence verti-
cal integration. Instrumental variable approach (IV), known also as two stage
least squares estimation (2SLS), requires the identification of new variables,
labeled instruments, that are correlated with the problematic (endogenous)
regressor (social capital in the present paper), but uncorrelated with the error
term of the original regression. Once the instruments have been identified,
2SLS prescribes to regress the endogenous regressor on the instruments (plus
the control variables) and compute its predicted values in the first stage. Then,
in the second stage, the original values of the endogenous regressor in the ini-
tial regression are substituted by the predicted ones. The coefficients obtained
from the estimation of this second-stage model do not suffer from problems
arising due to simultaneous causality (Stock and Watson, 2007; Greene, 2018).
The approach followed in the present paper differs from the canonical 2SLS
procedure in the way standard errors are computed. As far as the selection
of the appropriate instruments is concerned, the literature suggests that so-
cial capital is lower in heterogeneous societies (Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2002). Several authors have pointed to the fact that indi-
viduals tend to trust more those who are similar to them in terms of race,
language, culture and religion, so that the overall level of trust is higher in
homogeneous societies (Coleman, 1990; DeBruine, 2002; Guiso et al., 2009;
Leigh, 2006). Fractionalization measures (also known as fragmentation mea-
sures), correspond to the probability that two randomly picked individuals
from a population belong to two different groups. The theoretical maximum
value of one is reached when each person belongs to a different group and
the minimum value of zero when a population is perfectly homogeneous, i.e.
when all the individuals belong to the same group.22. Following this stream
of research, we have collected data on two possible instruments for social cap-
ital, selected according to the relevant literature. The first one is a measure
of ethnic fractionalization taken from Fearon (2003), and the second one is a
measure of religious fragmentation taken from Alesina et al. (2003).23 Using
22Generally, a fractionalization measure is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of the
shares of population belonging to different groups. For instance, if country j has N ethnic groups,
then the fractionalization measure, F will be computed as Fj = 1 −
PN
i=i(sij)
2, where sij is the
share of the group i in country j.
23Germany and Czech Republic, as we know them now, are not present in the dataset by Fearon
(2003) and are thus proxied using data on Federal Germany and Czechoslovakia, respectively. Data
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both instruments simultaneously we have performed a 2SLS regression analy-
sis. Results are displayed in Table 5, column 6. Due to the multilevel structure
of the data employed in the analyses, we were concerned that the standard er-
rors of the estimates in the second stage regression could be underestimated,
which translates in an overestimation of coefficients’ significance. We have
thus decided to compute bootstrapped standard errors using non-parametric
bootstrapping with replacement and 10000 replications; p-value’s are obtained
considering a normal distribution (for more information, see chapter 11 in
Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). Diagnostic tests are reported in Table 6. The
statistic labeled Weak instruments performs an F-test of the joint significance
of the instruments in the first stage regression. Accordingly, we reject the null
hypothesis that the instruments are weak (Anderson, 1958; Stock and Yogo,
2005). The Wu-Hausman test informs us about the consistency of the OLS
compared to the 2SLS. We reject the null that OLS and 2SLS estimates are
equally consistent in favor of 2SLS (Hausman, 1983). Lastly, According to
the Saragan statistic (Sargan, 1958), instruments are exogenous (incorrelated
with the errors of the second stage regression). Moving to the interpretation
of the coefficients, instrumental variable approach confirms that Civic Engage-
ment negatively affects vertical integration. Furthermore, the coefficient is four
times larger in absolute terms than in previous regressions. This points to the
fact that probably OLS underestimates the true impact of social capital on
vertical integration. Last but not least, the IV procedure suggests that our
estimates are not biased due to omitted variables.
Diagnostic tests
df1 df2 statistc p-value
Weak instruments 2 921 20.047 3e-09⇤⇤⇤
Wu-Hausman 1 921 3.491 0.062⇤⇤
Saragan 1 NA 1.297 0.255
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 6: Diagnostic tests for the 2SLS regression re-
ported in Table 5, column 6.
for Luxembourg are completely missing and are proxied using data on ethnic groups (nationalities)
taken from The World Factbook (2017).
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5 Limitations, conclusions and suggestions
for future research
In the previous sections we have provided some evidence in support of the idea
that make-or-buy decisions of firms depend crucially on the social environment
in which they operate. The present paper is a first attempt to study the impact
of social capital on the degree of vertical integration in manufacturing sectors.
As such it suffers from some limitations. To begin with, our measure of ver-
tical integration is defined at the level of industries within countries, while
the independent variables are measured at the country level. Further analyses
with more dis-aggregated data are required to confirm our results. Due to
data availability we have not considered several possible variables influencing
vertical integration. This may generate an omitted variable bias that we have
tried to wipe out using instrumental variables. We are referring here to prox-
ies for asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity of the production process.
We have tried to overcome this shortcoming using data on capital intensity in
the US as representative for the whole world or dividing industrial sectors by
R&D intensity. However such variables do not vary between countries. Further
analyses with more detailed data are needed and will clarify how social capital
interacts with classical determinants of vertical integration (asset specificity,
uncertainty, complexity etc.). Nevertheless we believe that the present paper
provides a new opportunity to understand how the organization of production
differs across countries due to socio-cultural factors. The results are promising:
as expected, social capital negatively affects vertical integration. In environ-
ments characterized by high levels of social capital, firms rely more on the
market and less on internal production for their inputs. On the other hand, in
environments characterized by low levels of social capital, vertical integration
arises as a response to the threat of opportunistic behaviors in the market-
place. Furthermore, the coefficient associated with social capital is robust to
different specifications of the model. There are at least two reasons why our
results may underestimate the effect of social capital on vertical integration.
Firstly, given the abundant evidence showing the impact of both social cap-
ital and trust on formal institutions (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al.,
2006), it is possible that the overall effect of social capital on vertical integra-
tion is much larger than the one obtained considering only its direct impact.
Secondly, our analysis is based only on European countries, that are quite ho-
mogeneous in terms of social capital due to a common history. Enlarging the
sample beyond European regions to include also countries with very different
levels of social capital, may cause its impact to rise significantly. Although we
have focused mainly on TCE, our main hypothesis that social capital reduces
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vertical integration fits also other theories, like the incomplete-contracts one.
The analyses described in the previous sections rely on two implicit hypoth-
esis. The first one is that within industries there is substantial homogeneity
between firms in the degree of vertical integration. Secondly, countries are
considered to be homogeneous in terms of social capital. Both issues are still
debated (for what concerns industrial structure: Stigler (1951); Perry (1989);
Pieri (2018); for social capital: Puntscher et al. (2016)). Accordingly, one of
the next steps in the research agenda could be the replication of the analyses
conducted above, but this time using less aggregated data, like regional ones.
Next, one can argue that the same factors that are ultimately responsible
for transaction costs, may also explain failures of internal organization (Knight,
1921; Pfeffer, 1981; Williamson, 1971, 1973; Klein et al., 1978; Masten et al.,
1991). Gibbons (2010) however, noticed that the majority of empirical studies
in TCE simply disregard the costs of internal organization, and contrast costs
of non-integration with those of vertical integration.
In conclusion, data employed in this paper have some limitations and the
results obtained need to be confirmed in other settings. Nevertheless, at least
two facts emerge. To begin with, social capital reduces vertical integration
and this result is robust to different specifications of the model. Secondly,
social capital has a stronger impact in low-R&D intensity industries than in
high-R&D intensity ones due to the different complexity of the traded goods.
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We develop a simple model to account for reciprocal behavior in a supplier-
buyer relationship. We do so by formalizing a setting in which a downstream
firm (the buyer) needs an essential input, but does not know exactly the char-
acteristics of the input that are best suited in the different possible states of
the world. This input is purchased from a better-informed upstream firm (the
supplier). The preferences of the two firms about which input to trade can
be divergent. If not motivated by reciprocity, the supplier produces the input
that provides it with the highest profit. When we extend the model to include
reciprocity, we show that the supplier may be willing to give-up part of its own
profits to reward a kind buyer. This enlarges the set of enforceable contracts
and makes it profitable for the downstream firm to extend the scope of dele-
gation to the upstream firm. Furthermore, we show that for some delegation
to occur, it is enough that the supplier is moderately reciprocal.
JEL Classifications: L22, D23, D4, D91, A13.
Keywords: Delegation; Vertical integration; Market exchange; Reciprocity;
Social capital
1 Introduction
While technological factors shape the boundaries of firms and industries, they
are not the sole determinant of the organization of production. Firms and
industries differ substantially from country to country in the degree of vertical
integration, scope of delegation and other aspects of the organization. The
literature has suggested that this could be explained by differences in formal
institutions and credit markets. Countries where it is hard to write and en-
force long-term contracts due to under-developed institutions are characterized
by the presence of more integrated firms (Acemoglu et al., 2009). Vertically
Part of this research has been developed at Famnit-Univerza na Primorskem, Koper (Slovenija).
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integrated firms are also prevalent in countries with highly developed credit
markets (Acemoglu et al., 2009). The present paper introduces the idea that
the organization of production is determined also by the socio-cultural envi-
ronment in which firms operate. We develop a simple principal-agent model to
show that the inclusion of psychological considerations enriches the set of en-
forceable contracts, as experimentally confirmed by Fehr et al. (1997). We show
that when the agent is motivated by reciprocity, the principal is more likely
to delegate the choice of the action. Specifically, we consider a downstream
firm (the principal/buyer) that needs an input produced by an upstream firm
(the agent/supplier). The characteristics of the input that best suites the
needs of the downstream firm are private information of the upstream firm
and depend on the state of the world that materializes after the contract has
been signed. We thus employ a key assumption of the incomplete-contracts
literature, namely that some features of the input/production process can not
be contracted upon (Grossman and Hart, 1986). We can imagine a situa-
tion in which the true state of the world is observable only to the upstream
firm or in which the downstream firm specifies it needs to the upstream firm
which then produces the input that, according to its superior knowledge, best
suites the needs of the downstream firm. Still another possibility is that it
is extremely costly for the downstream firm to acquire information about the
state of the world/input and to write/enforce a state-contingent contract, so
that it is not profitable to do so. Whichever the case, we are interested in a
situation in which the downstream firm is not able to contractually bind the
upstream firm to produce the input that best suites it needs.1 We posit that
the downstream firm can propose to the upstream firm two types of contracts.
One that specifies exactly the characteristics of the input to be traded and
one that leaves the choice of the characteristics to the the upstream firm. We
interpret the first contract as an employment relationship (vertical integra-
tion) and the second-one as a market transaction. We do so on the basis that
the key feature of employment relationship can be identified in the employer’s
authority to tell an employee exactly what to do (Coase, 1937). If the sec-
ond contract is offered, an opportunistic upstream firm supplies the input that
maximizes its profits, regardless of the consequences on the downstream firm.
We show that when the upstream firm is motivated by reciprocity, it may sup-
ply the input that best suites the needs of the downstream firm even if this is
not its profit-maximizing strategy. In turn, the downstream firm is more likely
to delegate the decision about the input to the upstream firm. Therefore a
1If the downstream firm is able to write and enforce state-contingent contracts at negligible
costs, then the effect of reciprocity is of little interest. This is why we rule out such situations and
focus on settings where state-contingent contracts are not enforceable.
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relationship which is more similar to a market transaction prevails. Individu-
als tend to be more concerned with the consequences of their own actions on
others when they are embedded in a dense network of social relationships. The
literature has labeled this network social capital (Putnam et al., 1994). Social
capital promotes trust, trustworthiness and reciprocity among the members of
the network (Putnam et al., 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Durlauf and Fafchamps,
2005). As long as social capital induces reciprocal behavior, our results are in
line with the empirical findings in Bloom et al. (2012a,b); Kastl et al. (2013)
and Gur and Bjørnskov (2017), that delegation is more likely to be observed
when trust and social capital are particularly pronounced. In view of the fact
that social capital enriches the set of feasible contracts and reduces unproduc-
tive expenses (monitoring, contractual enforcement), our model adds to the
literature on the positive effects of social capital on economic performance of
countries (Fehr et al., 1997; Huck et al., 2012). The paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the basic features
of the model. Section 4 develops the baseline model. Section 5 extends the
model to account for reciprocal behavior. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs
and the solutions of the maximization problems are in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The literature usually interprets vertical integration as the (only) solution to
the risk of being exploited by an unfair transaction counterpart. However, ver-
tical integration is costly. Firms may be cash-constrained and financial mar-
kets imperfect, so that vertical integration is not a viable option (Acemoglu
et al., 2009). The literature has identified other solutions to the problem of
opportunism. Contracts can include monetary incentives that depend on the
behavior of the transacting parts. This implicitly requires some degree of ver-
ifiability and external enforceability of contracts. In real-world situations it
could be difficult to monitor the counterpart and courts may have a hard time
in identifying contract breaches. A less demanding possibility is to design pay-
ment schemes that are contingent on the performance which may be, however,
a poor signal of effort as it may depend on factors external to the transac-
tion (Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2018). All this solutions rest on the
central hypothesis that individuals are purely selfish and do not care for the
consequences of their actions on others. The literature has recognized that it
is possible to account for non-opportunistic behavior also within the canoni-
cal framework of rationality, complete information and utility maximization.
Relational contracts models analyze infinitely-repeated games between a seller
and a buyer of an input (Baker et al., 2002). These models show that, under
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certain conditions, reputation concerns, captured by the discounted monetary
value of continuing the relationship, may outweigh monetary benefits from
contract breaches. Both relational contracts approach and our reciprocity-
based model try to explain why and how purely opportunistic behavior may
be mitigated and derive the conditions such that this is the case. However,
our approach differs from the literature on relational contacts in at least two
important ways. To begin with, the above mentioned literature does not re-
ally go beyond the classical profit-maximizing paradigm, as it just modifies
the profit function of firms. What we are trying to do is instead to explicitly
include non-monetary incentives in the payoff function. Secondly, our model
can be used to explain non-opportunistic behavior also in one-shot interactions
(spot-market transaction in our setting), while relational contracts require an
infinite number of interactions. Another way in which economists have tried to
include other-regarding behavior is to assume that individuals may be altruis-
tic and simply care for the well-being (utility) of others (Englmaier and Leider,
2012; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 2018). Within the framework of in-
dustrial relations this assumption seems highly unlikely (Lane and Bachmann,
1996). Furthermore, according to psychological evidence, individuals are far
more complex than this. Humans tend to help those who are kind to them
and to hurt those who are unkind. Our model is in line with the literature
on reciprocity, pioneered by Rabin (1993) for simultaneous-move games and
by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for sequential-move games. A recip-
rocal individual is prepared to sacrifice part of his own material payoff for the
sake of helping/hurting someone who has been kind/unkind to him. A large
body of laboratory experiments confirms that it is reciprocity and not pure
altruism that guides other-regarding behavior of individuals (McCabe et al.,
1998; Dawes and Thaler, 1988). By leveraging on reciprocity, the downstream
firm can align the incentives of the upstream firm with its own. Also in our
model the Ally Principle (Huber and Shipan, 2006) holds: the more the up-
stream firm is aligned (reciprocal), the more delegated it will be. Our model
can also explain why, even if the conditions are favorable for vertical integra-
tion (inefficient courts, specific investments, specific inputs), firms continue to
rely on market transactions. We apply the framework of Englmaier and Lei-
der (2012) in a contest of delegation of decision rights, where reciprocity may
rule-out purely selfish behavior. Another, more technical, difference between
our model and the one developed in Englmaier and Leider (2012) is that they
consider a static game, with no time dynamic. Since the realization of the
state of the world depends on the actions of the agent, in their setting the in-
dividual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraint are both solved
before the true state of the world materializes. In our model, instead, the
upstream firm accepts the contract before the state of the world materializes,
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but acts after the state of the world materializes. The paper which is closest
in spirit to ours is probably De Chiara and Manna (2018). Also their focus is
on the extent of delegation in a principal-agent problem, when the agent can
be reciprocal. The main difference with our model rests on how the reciprocal
behavior is leveraged. While in De Chiara and Manna (2018) it s the scope of
delegation that inactivates a reciprocal behavior by the agent, in our setting
it is the more/less generous price proposed by the buyer that induces a more
loyal attitude by the seller. The present paper is closely related also to the
literature on efficiency-wage models. According to this literature, employers
with limited monitoring ability may choose to give to the employee an extra-
rent over its outside option to limit shirking. This extra-effort can be simply
due to the worker’s fear of loosing such a good-payed job or may be a “gift”to
a kind employer (Akerlof, 1982).2 A key difference between our model and the
classical efficiency-wage model in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is that our model
can be applied also when there is no possibility to punish shirking, while their
model requires at least some small probability that shirkers are detected (and
punished).
3 The model
We consider a downstream firm D that needs an essential input which is
produced by an upstream firm U . The characteristics of the input that are
best suited for firm D are ex-ante unknown and depend on the state of the
world that materializes only once the contract between D and U has been
signed. We assume that there are n   2 states of the world, S = {1, . . . , n},
all equally likely ex-ante and that both firms share identical beliefs about
the probability distribution of S: Prob(s = i) = p, 8i 2 [1, n], such that
n⇥ p = 1. Once the contract is signed, firm U observes the state of the world
and chooses the quality/characteristics of the input. We label this different
qualities qi, i 2 [1,m],m   n. The cost to firm U of producing the input qi is
c(qi) = ci, 8i 2 [1,m]. Without loss of generality we assume that these inputs
are ordered from the most to the least expensive: ci > ci+1, 8i 2 [1,m   1].
Firm D uses this inputs to produce an output worth R (high-value output) or
r (low-value output), such that R > r > 0. We assume the difference R   r
to be “large”. We specify later in the paper what we mean by “large”.3 The
low-value output r can be always produced, no matter the quality of the in-
put employed. The high-value output R can be produced only if the input is
2Akerlof and Yellen (1990) review numerous sociological explanations why workers should reduce
their effort when they think that they are under-payed.
3This assumption rules out cases in which non delegation is trivially optimal for firm D.
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tailored to the state of the world that realizes. We refer to this input as the
“appropriate-quality input”(or “appropriate input”, for brevity). In the state
s = i, only qi allows D to produce R, while all other qj allow D to produce
only r, 8i 2 [1, n]; 8j 2 [1,m]; i 6= j.More specifically, the timing of the game
is as follows (see also Figure 1):
t0 firm D offers a contract to firm U ;
t1 firm U accepts the contract if it guarantees a payoff greater than its
outside option U and rejects the contract otherwise;
t2 Nature chooses the state of the world s̃ 2 S;
t3 firm U observes the state of the world s̃ 2 S and delivers an input qi;
t4 payoffs are realized.
t0




Nature chooses s̃ 2 S
t3
U observes s̃ 2 S and delivers qi
t4
payoffs are realized
Figure 1: Timing of the game
We assume that the downstream firm can offer only two types of contracts.
A contract that specifies exactly the quality of the input that firm U has to
deliver, qi, and the associated price, ω: {qi;ω}, with i 2 [1,m]. We refer to it
as the “binding contract”. The second type of contract indicates a fixed price
and leaves the upstream firm to be completely free in the choice of the quality
it prefers: {q1, . . . , qm;ω}. We refer to it as the “delegating contract”. We
assume that intermediate forms of contracts that specify a limited number of
qualities, e.g. two qualities, among which to choose are not feasible. Moreover,
for the delegating contract, we assume that the price can not be contingent
to the quality that is delivered.4 We interpret the binding contract as vertical
integration and the delegating contract as market transaction. As mentioned
in the introductory section, a key difference between vertical organization and
market transaction is that in the first case the employer can tell the employees
exactly what to do (Coase, 1937). Complete delegation of the characteristics of
the input is, indeed, an extreme case which is useful for modeling purposes but
we do not expect to observe it in real-world transactions. Still, we think that
there are many situations where a buyer describes the general features of the
input and then relies on supplier suggestions for some specific characteristics
4We discuss this assumption in the concluding section of the paper. For an overview of some
reasons why this might be the case, see the introductory section in Alonso and Matouschek (2008).
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for which it has superior knowledge. As formalized above, the downstream firm
always produces its output, no matter the quality of the input. However, the
quality of the input determines the quality (and the value to the downstream
firm) of the output. We can thus imagine a situation in which the supplier
simply provides the buyer with an input or it can actively try to figure out the
needs of the buyer and provides the most appropriate input. Many times inputs
are so standardized that it is difficult to justify the assumption of contracts’
incompleteness. If it is costly to write contracts, their incompleteness can be
purposeful in the sense that a party relies on the good behavior of the other to
“complete”the contract (Kőszegi, 2014). If this is the case, our model explains
how this completion occurs.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible and to focus on the impact
of reciprocal behavior on input procurement, we abstract from some possible
determinants of vertical integration. In greater detail, we set the costs of
vertical integration equal to zero, both for what concerns the acquisition of
machinery and for higher organizational costs stemming from the unification
of different production phases under the same ownership. We do so on the
basis that acquisition of machinery and organizational costs will have entered
the production function of firm D as two constants with negative signs (i.e.
costs). They will have well reduced the profitability of vertical integration
and thus the likelihood that this solution will be observed, but the qualitative
results of our model will have remained unchanged. Furthermore, and in line
with Grossman and Hart (1986), the fact that a vertically integrated firm has
no way to produce a state-contingent input can be explicitly considered a cost
associated with that organizational form. Lastly, we assume both firms to be
risk-neutral. 5
4 Benchmark
We solve for the optimal contract from the point of view of firm D when both
firms are selfish. In Section 5 we extend the model to allow for reciprocal
behavior by firm U .
The payoff of firm U is πU (qi) = ω   ci, 8i 2 [1,m]. This payoff function is
strictly decreasing in the cost ci associated to quality qi. Player D would like
firm U to always choose the appropriate quality, but has no way to enforce
such a contract. Thus, if firm D proposes the delegating contract, U always
chooses the input with the smallest associated cost: qm. Therefore, in this
setting the contract {q1, . . . , qm;ω} is equivalent to the contract {qm;ω}. The
5This is a usual assumption of vertical-integration models; see, for instance: Hart and Moore
(1990); Baker et al. (2002))
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expected payoff of firm D before the state of the world materializes (ex-ante)
takes the following form:
πD(qi) =
(
pR+ (1  p)r   ω, for qi, i 2 {1, . . . , n}
r   ω, for qi, i 2 {n+ 1, . . . ,m}
(1)
Two cases are considered separately in what follows: {qi;ω}, i 2 [1, n] and
{qj ;ω}, j 2 [n+1,m]. We assume that firm D holds all the bargaining power.
This means that D offers a contract that leaves U exactly indifferent between
accepting the contract and refusing it.
The optimal contract to induce firm U to choose the quality qi, i 2 [1, n] solves
the following maximization problem:
max
ω
pR+ (1  p)r   ω
s.t. ω   ci   U (I.R.)
(2)
The solution is given by ω⇤i = U + ci. Since πD = pR + (1  p)r   (U + ci) is
strictly decreasing in ci and when the contract is proposed, all the states of the
world are equally likely to occur, the optimal contract for firmD is {qn;U+cn}.
In other words, D offers the contract that induces the choice of the least costly
quality among those that generate R with positive probability. The ex-ante
profits of the two firms are: πU = U and πD = pR + (1   p)r   (U + cn),
respectively.
Analogously, the optimal contract to induce firm U to choose the quality qj , j 2




s.t. ω   cj   U (I.R.)
(3)
The solution is given by ω⇤j = U+cj .
6 The optimal contract for firm D is again
the one associated with the smallest possible cost: {qm;U + cm}. The profits
of the two firms are, respectively: πU = U,πD = r   (U + cm). Throughout
the paper we will assume that from the point of view of firm D the contract
{qn;U + cn} is ex-ante always (weakly) preferred to {qm;U + cm}, which is
true as long as as long as:
p(R  r)   cn   cm. (4)
6Computations omitted for brevity, since they are analogous to those for problem (2).
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5 Reciprocity
In this section we extend the model to allow for reciprocal behavior by firm
U . We derive the condition under which the delegating contract is offered
and determine which delegating contract is optimal for firm D. A reciprocal
individual is willing to give up part of his material payoff in order to punish
those who treat him unkindly and to reward those who treat him kindly. In our
setting the outside option represents the reference point to distinguish between
the two cases. If firm D offers a contract that allows firm U to get a payoff
which is strictly larger than its outside option, then firmD is perceived as kind,
and vice versa.7 If D proposes a contract that leaves U completely indifferent
between accepting it or not, then D is not perceived as kind, nor as unkind,
and we are back to the setting without reciprocity. We continue to assume that
D can propose only two types of contracts, binding and delegating. However,
due to reciprocity, by varying ω, in the delegating contract, D can induce U
to choose the appropriate quality in more or less states of the world. As will
be shown shortly, in this setting U may prefer not to choose the quality with
the smallest associated cost, so that contract {q1, . . . , qm;ω} is not equivalent
to {qm;ω} anymore. Initially we consider the case in which D chooses ω to
induce U to appropriately select qi in all the states of the world. We refer to
it as the “fully-delegating contract”. The profit function of firm D remains as
in the benchmark, while the payoff function of firm U is now made up of two
parts: its material payoff and its reciprocity payoff, modeled as in Englmaier
and Leider (2012) and Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2018):8







The material payoff corresponds to profits. The reciprocity payoff is made
up of three terms. The first one, µ   0, is U ’s sensitivity to reciprocity. It
captures how much U is concerned with the consequences of its actions on D.
If µ = 0 we are back in the benchmark. The second term, K, is the kindness
function. It is computed as the difference between the payoff that U expects
to obtain under the proposed contract (the “job description”) and the outside






i=1 ci is the expected
7We think that the outside option is a natural reference point for assessing perceived kindness.
Still, our results hold if we imagine the reference point to be a different fixed value.
8For certain values of the parameters it may happen that the profits of firm U are negative
ex-post. In our modeling we exclude limited liability considerations, so that firm U produces the
appropriate quality even when this is not ex-post profitable (we assume U to be “deep-pocket”).
We do so because limited liability considerations do not add substantially to our model and do not
change our results.
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cost for firm U before the state of the world is revealed. If K > 0 (K < 0), D
is giving to U something more (less) than the outside option and we say that
D is perceived as kind (unkind). If K = 0 we are back in the benchmark. The
third term is simply D’s expected gross revenues under the proposed contract.
The optimal delegating contract to induce U to always choose the appropriate




s.t. ω   E[c] + µKR   U (I.R.)
ω   ci + µKR   ω   cj + µKr; 8i 2 [1, n], 8j 2 [1,m], i 6= j (I.C.)
(6)
The first constraint, I.R., is the individual rationality constraint. Under the
proposed contract, U receives ω, chooses the appropriate quality in each state
of the world, thus bearing an expected cost E[c], and generates a reciprocal
payoff µKR. For the I.R. to be satisfied this payoff has to be larger than or
equal to U .9 For the sake of explanation in what follows we refer to U + E[c]
as to the “individually-rational price”. I.C. contains (n ⇥ m)   1 incentive
compatibility constraints. They require that for every state of the world, the
appropriate quality maximizes U ’s payoff. These ensures that U finds it opti-
mal to always choose the appropriate quality. As we show in the Appendix,
the contract that solves the above maximization problem is:
⇢





The term U+E[c] is the individually-rational component of the price, necessary
to satisfy the I.R.; c1 cm
µ(R r) is the reciprocal component of the price, required to
induce reciprocal behavior. The reciprocal component of the price is larger the
higher the cost to U of producing the most expensive input (high c1) and the
lower the cost of the best alternative for U (high cm). The difference between
c1 and cm represents the increase in cost U faces if it decides to produce the
appropriate quality in the state s = 1, instead of the cheapest-one, qm. If this
difference is not very high, then the cost for U of the most expensive input
and of the least expensive input are not very different; consequently firm D
can induce reciprocal behavior by U at a relatively small cost. The reciprocal
component is smaller the more U is concerned with reciprocity (high µ). If U
is very concerned with the consequences of his actions on the profits of D, then
even a small increase of the price over the individually-rational part ensures
that the appropriate quality is always chosen by U . Finally, the reciprocal
9As in Englmaier and Leider (2012), the I.R. assures that D never offers a contract that induces
U to retaliate.
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component is larger the less important it is for D to get the appropriate input
(low R   r). If this difference is small, then the increase in the reciprocity
payoff of U from choosing the appropriate input instead of another input is
small. In order for the I.C. to hold, D must leverage on K by offering a high
price.
Apart from the delegating contract characterized above, firm D can also pro-
pose (one of the) two binding contracts identified in the previous section.
Since these contracts “bind” firm U in its choice of the quality, the bind-
ing contracts are the same as in the benchmark. Consider, first, that contract
{qi;ω}, i 2 [1, n] is offered. The kindness function is K
0 ⌘ (ω   ci)   U . The




pR+ (1  p)r   ω
s.t. ω   ci + µK
0[pR+ (1  p)r]   U (I.R.)
(8)
As in the benchmark, the solution is ω⇤i = U + ci. Again the optimal contract
for D is {qn;U + cn}. Analogously, if contract {qj ;ω}, j 2 [n+1,m] is offered,
the optimal contract for firm D is {qm;U + cm}. As in the benchmark we
assume that contract {qn;U + cn} is weakly preferred by D to {qm;U + cm}.
Firm U experiences reciprocal motives towards firm D if and only if its ex-
pected payoff under the job description is greater than its outside option. This
is to say, if the individual rationality constraint does not bind at the optimum.
We can conclude that to induce reciprocal behavior, firm D must offer to a
reciprocal firm U a payment which is strictly greater than those in the binding
contracts, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. To induce reciprocal behavior, firm D must offer to a reciprocal
firm U a price strictly greater than those in the binding contracts.
Having computed the price for the delegating contract, we now derive the
sufficient condition for this contract to be preferred to any binding contract.
This establishes a sufficient condition for delegation being optimal for firm D.
Proposition 1. With a reciprocal upstream firm, the fully-delegating contract
is preferred by D to any binding contract if:
µ  
c1   cm
(R  r)[((1  p)(R  r)  E[c] + cn]
. (9)
The above inequality states that the fully-delegating contract is more likely to
be observed when: U is very reciprocal (high µ); it is very important for firm
D to get the appropriate input (when R r is high); it is very unlikely that the
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true state of the world is the one indicated in the binding contract (p is low)
or this contract is very expensive (high cn); when the best alternative for U is
very expensive for it (high cm) or when it is relatively cheap for U to produce
even the most expensive input (low c1); when the expected cost of producing
the input is low (low E[c]).
5.1 The extent of delegation
In Proposition 1 we have stated the sufficient condition for delegation to be
optimal. Next issue is the extent of delegation. The fully-delegating con-
tract described in the previous section incentivizes firm U to choose the ap-
propriate quality in each state of the world. However, it may happen that
the appropriate inputs for the first s0 states of the world are so expensive,
that it is optimal for firm D to get qm and produce r if the state of the
world is s  s0, and to get the appropriate input otherwise. We refer to
this contract as a “partially-delegating contract”. The fully-delegating con-
tract is a special case of a partially-delegating contract, namely when s0 = 0.
The kindness function for the partially-delegating contract described above
is: K 00 ⌘ ω   E[c] + p[
Ps0
i=1 ci   s
0cm]   U . Formally, the optimal partially-
delegating contract solves the following maximization problem:
max
ω
(1  s0p)R+ (s0p)r   ω







+ µK 00[(1  s0p)R+ (s0p)r]   U (I.R.)
ω   ci + µK
00R   ω   cj + µK
00r; 8i 2 [s0 + 1, n], 8j 2 [1,m], i 6= j (I.C.1)
ω   ci + µK
00R  ω   cm + µK
00r; 8i  s0 (I.C.2)
(10)
The I.R. is the individual rationality constraint. Under the proposed contract,
U receives ω, chooses qm if s  s
0 and the appropriate quality otherwise, thus
bearing a cost p
⇥Pn










a reciprocal payoff µK 00[(1   s0p)R + (s0p)r]. For the I.R. to be satisfied this
payoff has to be larger than or equal to U . I.C.1 requires that U delivers the
appropriate input when the state of the world is s 2 [s0 + 1, n]. I.C.2 requires
that quality qm is delivered if the state of the world is s  s
0. As shown in the
Appendix, the solution to the above maximization problem is:
ω












We interpret E[c]   p
h
Ps0
i=1 ci   s
0cm
i
+ U as the individually-rational com-
ponent of the price and
cs0+1 cm
µ(R r) as the reciprocity component. The reciprocal
component of the price is larger the higher the cost to U of producing the most
expensive input (high cs0+1) and the lower the cost of the best alternative for U
(high cm). The difference between cs0+1 and cm represent the increase in cost
U faces if it decides to produce the appropriate quality in the state s = s0 +1,
instead of the cheapest-one, qm. If this difference is not very high, then the
cost of the most expensive input and of the least expensive input are not very
different; consequently firm D can induce reciprocal behavior by U at a rela-
tively small cost. The reciprocal component is smaller the more U is concerned
with reciprocity (high µ). If U is very concerned with the consequences of his
actions on the profits of D, then even a small increase of the price over the
individually-rational component ensures that the appropriate quality is always
chosen by U . Finally, the reciprocal component is larger the less important it
is for D to get the right input (low R  r). If this difference is small, then the
increase in the reciprocity payoff of U from choosing the appropriate input in-
stead of another input is small. In order for the I.C.1 to hold, D must leverage
on K by offering a high price.
In what follows we compute the condition for the fully-delegating contract to
be preferred to a partially-delegating contract implementing qm if s  s
0 and
the appropriate quality otherwise.
Proposition 2. The fully-delegating contract is preferred by firm D to the
partially-delegating contract that implements qm if s  s
0 and the appropriate
quality otherwise as long as:
µ  
c1   cs0+1
p(R  r)[s0(R  r)  (
Ps0
i=1 ci   s
0cm)]
. (12)
The fully-delegating contract is more likely to be preferred to a partially-
delegating contract such that U delivers the appropriate-quality input when
the state of the world is s  s0 and qm otherwise, when: firm U is very
reciprocal (high µ); the most expensive input is not very expensive (low c1);
and it is very important for D to get the right input (high R   r). For the
fully-delegating contract to be optimal condition (12) must hold for any s0  n.
We turn now to the identification of the optimal partially-delegating contract
from the point of view of firm D. The optimal s0 for firm D is the largest value
of s such that the contract implementing the appropriate quality for all but
s0 states of the world is preferred to the one that implements the appropriate
quality for all but s0 + 1 states of the world. If we make the simplifying
assumption that the difference in cost of producing two subsequent inputs is
constant, ci ci+1 ⌘ ∆c, 8i 2 [1,m 1], we can state the following proposition:
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Proposition 3. If we assume ∆c = ci   ci+1 to be constant for every i 2
[1,m   1], the optimal partially-delegating contract from the point of view of
firm D is the one that implements qm for s  s
0⇤ and the appropriate input




































where bxc is the floor function, i.e. the function that returns the greatest
integer smaller or equal to x.
More delegation is granted to firm U when: it is very sensitive to reciprocity
(high µ); the difference in cost between two subsequent inputs is small (low
∆c); and the probability p is high. In what follows we will refer to s0⇤ as
the “optimal level of delegation”. Notice that, by construction, s0⇤ = n is
equivalent to a contract that binds U at producing qm. The following corollary
states the condition for full-delegation to be granted when ci  ci+1 ⌘ ∆c, 8i 2
[1,m  1].
Corollary 1. If we assume ∆c = ci ci+1 to be constant for every i 2 [1,m 1],











Full delegation is more likely to be granted when; firm U is very reciprocal
(high µ); it is very important for D to get the appropriate input (R   r is
high); and when the difference in cost between two subsequent inputs is small
(small ∆c).
The above Corollary states the condition on µ, such that it is optimal for
firm D to grant full delegation to firm U , i.e. s0⇤ = 0. Analogously, the
following Corollary states the condition such that firm U is bind at producing
qm (s
0⇤ = n):
Corollary 2. If we assume ∆c = ci ci+1 to be constant for every i 2 [1,m 1],











We now turn to a more detailed characterization of how s0⇤ varies as a function
of µ. The following Corollary establishes the conditions such that intermediate
levels of delegation (s0⇤ = i, i 2 [1, n  1]) are optimal for D.
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Corollary 3. If full delegation is not reached, we have that for the optimal





















We indicate with µi, i 2 [0, n] the largest value of µ such that s
0⇤ = i and with
with ∆µi ⌘ µi   µi+1, i 2 [0, n   1], the difference between two subsequent
values of µi. Two cases are considered separately. To begin with, if s
0⇤ = 0,
we have that µ0 = 1 and ∆µ0 = 1. Secondly, if s


























As can be seen from equation (17), for every i 2 [1, n] we have that µi is finite
and for every i 2 [1, n   1], µi > µi+1. Since µ0 = 1, we have that for every
i 2 [0, n  1]:
µi > µi+1. (19)
We can now make the following statement about ∆µi.
Proposition 4. For every i 2 [0, n   2], we have that the difference between
two subsequent values of µi, ∆µi ⌘ µi   µi+1 is such that ∆µi > ∆µi+1.
The intuition behind this proposition can be better appreciated graphically.
Figure 2 reports on the horizontal axis the value of µ and on the vertical axis
the optimal level of delegation s0⇤. Recall that the lower the value of s0⇤, the
more firm U is delegated. The solid line plots s0⇤ as function of µ for given
values of p, (R   r),∆c,m. At µ = 0, we have that there is no delegation at
all (s0⇤ = n). Then, if we slowly move rightward along the horizontal axis
and cross µn, the value of s
0⇤ “jumps”to n  1, meaning that if the sensitivity
parameter µ belongs to the interval ]µn, µn 1], firm U is “delegated”to produce
qn if the state of the world is s = n. In order for U to be delegated to choose
the appropriate quality in two states of the world s = {n, n   1}, a larger
increase in µ is required: ∆µn 1 > ∆µn. Then, to further enlarge the scope
of delegation to three states of the world s = {n, n  1, n  2}, an even larger
increase in µ is required: ∆µn 2 > ∆µn 1. Every additional state of the world
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Figure 2: Solid lines represent s0⇤ as a function of µ for given values of p, (R  
r),∆c,m.
that is added to those for which firm U produces the appropriate input requires
a larger increase in µ. This means that neglecting the role of reciprocity (i.e.
assuming µ = 0) leads to inaccurate predictions even when the actual level
of the parameter µ is low. To observe delegation it is enough that firm U is
moderately reciprocal.
6 Conclusion and discussion
In the present paper we have developed a simple principal-agent model of pro-
curement that accounts for other-regarding behavior. We have shown that
when the upstream firm is motivated by reciprocity, the set of enforceable con-
tracts is enlarged. Inducing reciprocal behavior is thus a way in which firms
may limit, or even prevent, opportunistic behavior. This allows the down-
stream firm to delegate more decision to the upstream firm without the risk of
being exploited. We interpret the binding contract as an employment relation-
ship (vertical integration) and the delegating contract as market transaction.
Our model is not the first attempt to study supplier relationships with non
purely-selfish firms. Compared to other similar attempts we identify two ele-
ments of novelty in our model. Firstly, we explicitly include a non-monetary
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component in the payoff of the upstream firm. Secondly, we show that it
is possible to elicit reciprocal behavior also in one-shot interactions. In our
model we posit that contracts with state-contingent payments are not enforce-
able. This assumption is not as strong as it may seem. According to Fehr and
Tyran (1996) reciprocity is particularly important in an incomplete-contracts
framework. As a matter of fact, if all the possible contingencies are already
considered in a contract, then both a reciprocal and a purely-selfish firm be-
have as established by the contract and reciprocity does not add anything to
the prescriptive nor to the normative power of the model. Furthermore, if
we consider that writing long, state-contingent payment schemes is costly, our
model posits that it is possible to induce the upstream firm to produce the ap-
propriate quality even if the contract specifies just one payment. Social capital
enters our model in terms of the sensitivity parameter µ. We imagine that the
higher the level of social capital, the more the upstream firm is reciprocal. A
potential weakness of our model is that it abstracts from the market structure
in that it does not take into account the possibility that there are several up-
stream and downstream firms competing in the market. This weakness is not
peculiar to our model, but is common to a vast literature in industrial organi-
zation (see, for instance, the models in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Baker
et al. (2002)). Secondly, apart from a very simple example in Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004), the literature on reciprocity has generally focused on
games with two players (Rabin, 1993; Englmaier and Leider, 2012). A very
simple way to overcome the above mentioned weakness is to make the outside
option U of the upstream firm contingent on the market structure, i.e. the
outside option should be high when there are few upstream firms and/or many
downstream firms. In the context of our model this changes only the price of
the input, but does not affect the conditions for delegation to occur, as they are
independent from U . Modeling reciprocity in a context where several players
interact is certainly an interesting path for future research.
Following the mainstream approach in vertical integration literature, in our
model we assume both firms to be risk neutral (Hart and Moore, 1990; Baker
et al., 2002). Extending the analyses to allow one (or both) firms to be risk
averse is an interesting further development, but it is out of the scope of the
present paper.
In conclusion our model can help to explain why in the real world, even when
the standard approaches to industrial organization would predict vertical inte-
gration (high contracting costs, inefficient courts, specific investments), firms
continue to rely on market transactions.
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7 Appendix
Solution of Maximization problem (2)
max
ω
pR+ (1  p)r   ω
s.t. ω   ci   U (I.R.)
(20)
Since we are looking for the smallest value of ω that solves the above maximiza-
tion problem, the individual rationality (I.R.) constraint binds at the optimum:
ωi
⇤ = U + ci.
Proof of Inequality (4)
The expected payoff of D under contract {qn;U+cn} is pR+(1 p)r (U+cn),
while under contract {qm;U + cm} it is r   (U + cm). The first contract is
(weakly) preferred by D when the associated expected payoff is higher than that
associated with the second contract, i.e.:
pR+ (1  p)r   (U + cn)   r   (U + cm)
()
p(R  r)   cn   cm
(21)




s.t. ω   E[c] + µKR   U (I.R.)
ω   ci + µKR   ω   cj + µKr; 8i 2 [1, n], 8j 2 [1,m], i 6= j (I.C.)
(22)
The constraints can be rearranged as follows:
K[1 + µR]   0 (I.R.)
µK(R  r)   ci   cj ; 8i 2 [1, n], 8j 2 [1,m], i 6= j (I.C.)
(23)
The I.R. requires K to be non negative (it is easy to see that the term in braces
is strictly positive), from which:
ω   U + E[c]. (24)
The tightest I.C. requires that when s = 1, U produces the most expensive input
q1 instead of the cheapest-one qm:
µK(R  r)   c1   cm. (25)
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After substituting for K, the tightest I.C. is satisfied for





µ(R r) is strictly positive, when inequality (26) is satisfied, so does
inequality (24). Since we are looking for the lowest value of ω that induces
reciprocal behavior, the tightest I.C. binds at the optimum:
ω




Solution of Maximization problem (8)
max
ω
pR+ (1  p)r   ω
s.t. ω   ci + µK
0[pR+ (1  p)r]   U (I.R.)
(28)
The I.R. can be rearranged as follows:
K 0{1 + µ[pR+ (1  p)r]}   0. (29)
Since the term in braces is strictly positive, the above inequality is satisfied
as long as K 0   0, which is true for ω   U + ci. The solution to the above
maximization problem is given by the binding I.R.: ωi
⇤ = U + ci.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since ω⇤n = U + cn > U + cm = ω
⇤
m, it is sufficient to





The inequality is always satisfied, given that c1 cm
µ(R r) > 0 and E[c] > cn (recall
that E[c] is computed as the average of costs, the smallest being precisely cn).
Proof of Proposition 1. Since we are assuming that from the point of view
of D {qn;U + cn} is the optimal binding contract, it is enough to determine




{qn;U + cn}. To determine this condition, we compare the expected profits of
firm D under the two contracts:
R 
✓




  pR+ (1  p)r   (U + cn) . (31)
In Section 3 we required the difference R r to be large, without fully-specifying





When this condition holds, we have that the fully-delegating contract is pre-
ferred by D to any binding contract as long as:
µ  
c1   cm
(R  r)[(1  p)(R  r)  E[c] + cn]
. (33)
Contrariwise, if condition 32 does not hold, firm D never delegates.
Solution of Maximization problem (10)
max
ω
(1  s0p)R+ (s0p)r   ω







+ µK 00[(1  s0p)R+ (s0p)r]   U (I.R.)
ω   ci + µK
00R   ω   cj + µK
00r; 8i 2 [s0 + 1, n], 8j 2 [1,m], i 6= j (I.C. 1)
ω   ci + µK
00R  ω   cm + µK
00r; 8i  s0 (I.C. 2)
(34)
The constraints can be simplified as follows:
K 00
 
1 + µ[(1  s0p)R+ (s0p)r]
 
  0 (I.R.)
µK 00(R  r)   ci   cj ; 8i 2 [s
0 + 1, n], 8j 2 [1,m], i 6= j (I.C. 1)
µK 00(R  r)  ci   cm; 8i  s
0 (I.C. 2)
(35)
The I.R. requiresK 00 to be non negative, from which ω   E[c] p
h
Ps0















+ U ; (36)
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µ(R r) > 0 by construction, I.R. is implied by inequality (36).
Since cs0 > cs0+1, the right-hand side of inequality (36) is strictly smaller than
the right-hand side of inequality (37) and the tightest I.C.1 (i = s0 + 1, j = m)
binds at the optimum:
ω











Proof of Proposition 2. The delegating contract that always implements the
appropriate quality is preferred by firm D to the partially-delegating contract
that implements qm if s  s
0, and the appropriate quality otherwise as long as
its payoff is greater under the first contract than under the second:
R 
⇢

























ci   cm. (40)
If the above condition holds, then firm D prefers the fully-delegating contract
to any partially delegating contracts as long as:
µ  
c1   cs0+1
p(R  r)[s0(R  r)  (
Ps0
i=1 ci   s
0cm)]
. (41)
If condition (40) does not hold, then the partially-delegating contract that im-
plements qm if s  s
0, and the appropriate quality otherwise is preferred by
firm U to the fully-delegating contract.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The expected payoff of firm D from the partially-
delegating contract that implements the appropriate quality for all but the first
s0 states of the world is given by:











The expected payoff of firm D from the partially-delegating contract that im-














Firm D prefers the first contract as long as the expected profits are higher














The optimal value of s0 is the smallest value that implicitly solves the above








Since s0 is a state of the world, by construction, we have that s0 2 [0, n]. Thus,
if we indicate with bxc the floor function of x, i.e. the function that returns






































Proof of Corollary 1. Granting full delegation to firm U means that s0⇤ = 0.








Considering only the case when the above inequality binds, we have that this







In Section 3 we required R   r to be large. Here we formalize it by requiring
that:
R  r > (m  2)∆c. (49)












If, instead, condition (49) does not hold, firm U is not granted full-delegation.
Proof of Corollary 2. From Proposition 3, we have that the optimal level of



























10Also here we require R  r to be “large”. In this setting the requirement is already satisfied if
condition (49) holds.
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Proof of Corollary 3. From Proposition 3, we have that the optimal level of





































Proof of Proposition 4. Applying the definition of ∆µi, we have that, for
every i 2 [0, n  2], ∆µi > ∆µi+1 as long as:
µi   µi+1 > µi+1   µi+2, (55)
which can be simplified as follows:
µi   µi+2 > 0. (56)
Inequality (19) assures that the above condition is always satisfied.
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